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government, at no distant day, by the children of Chinese parents,
and in view of the omission to provide for the children of our own
people born abroad, our constitution ought, to be amended, and
that without delay.
THomAs P. STONEY.
San Francisco, Cal.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS,

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
SINGERLY v. THAYER..
T. agreed to put in for S. an elevator "warranted satisfactory in every respect."
After trying the elevator, S. refused to accept it.
Held, reversing the court below, that provided he acted in good faith, S. was by
the terms of the contract the sole judge whether the elevator was satisfactory.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
This was an action on the case to recover the contract price of an
elevator. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion which
was delivered by
MEROUR, C. J.-This contention arises on a contract contained
in the following written proposal, to wit:
FIFTEENTH AND MARKET,

PHILADELPHIA, PA., 8-10-1881.

WM. M. SINGERLY, ESQ.:
I propose to put my Patent Hydraulic Hoist in your new building on Chestnut street (including a duplex pump worth $800) according to verbal specifications given by your architect, for $2300,
warranted satisfactory in every respect.
Y ours,

ELI THAY:ER.

Plaintiff in error accepted this proposition. The elevator was
substantially finished. It proved to be unsatisfactory. He therefore
declined to accept it, and gave notice that he desired it to be removed.
This Thayer refused to do; thereupon Singerly took it down, and
holds it subject to the order of Thayer. The latter brought this
suit, claiming the contract price.
The controlling question is, What meaning and effect are to be
given to the words "warranted satisfactoryl in every respect ?"
Satisfactory to whom ? Certainly not to the maker only. Was it
to be satisfactory to the person for whom it was to be made and
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by whom it was to be used? The learned judge thought this was
not a necessary requirement, but if it was built in a workmanlike
manner and performed its intended purpose in a manner which
ought to be satisfactory to the plaintiff in error, that was sufficient.
In other words, it may have been wholly unsatisfactory to him, yet
if the jury thought he ought to have been satisfied, he was bound
to accept it. In effect, that is, it need not have operated to his
satisfaction in any respect, but to the satisfaction of the jury which
might be called on to pass on the rights of the parties.
The proposition was made to him to purchase a kind of elevator
not in general use. The fair inference is that he desired to purchase one that would be satisfactory to himself. The manifest
import and meaning of the language used is that it should be satisfactory to him. This, then, was the agreement. To him alone
was the proposition made. It would not have been any clearer had
it read, "1warranted satisfactory to you in every respect." He,
therefore, was the person to decide and to declare whether it was
satisfactory. This was a fact Which the contract gave him a right
to decide. He was the person negotiating for its purchase. Re
was the person who was to test it and to use it. No other persons
could intelligently determine whether in every respect he was satisfied therewith.
3l1fcarren v. 2iTeNulty et al., 7 Gray 139, was on an agreement
to make a book-case "in a good, strong and workmanlike manner,
to the satisfaction of the president of the society," for which it was
to be made. It was held not to be sufficient to prove that it
was constructed according to the terms of the agreement, without
also proving that it was satisfactory to or accepted by the defendant.
When the agreement is to make and furnish an article to the
satisfaction of the person for whom it is to be made, numerous
authorities declare it is not a compliance with the contract to prove
he ought to have been satisfied. It was so held in Gray v. Rd.,
11 Hun 70, where the contract was for the purchase of a steamboat; in Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136, where the agreement
was to make a suit of clothes; in Zalesici v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218,
on a contract for a plaster bust of a deceased husband of the defendant; in Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49, where a portrait was
to be satisfactory to the defendant, and in Hoffman v. Gallagher,
6 Daly 42, where a portrait of defendant was to be satisfactory to
his friends. So where a person got a set of teeth from a dentist
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under an agreement that they were to be satisfactory, it was held,
in Hartman v. Blackburn, 7 "Pittsburgh Legal Journal 140, that
he was made the exclusive judge of their value-.
To, justify a refusal to accept the elevator on the ground that it
was not satisfactory, the objection should be made in good faith.
It must not be merely capricious. It is declared in I Parsons onContracts 542, if A. agrees to-make something for B., to meet the
approval of B., or with any similar language, B. may reject it for
any objection which is made in good faith, and is not merely capricious. Andrew v. Befield, 2 0. B. (N. S.) 779, is cited to support
this view. That case arose on a written agreement to build a carriage, in a manner which should meet the approval. of the person
for whom it ras to be made, not only on the score of workmanship,
but also that of convenience and taste. It was held that his rejection, made in good faith, was conclusive.
This "hoist" is unlike those in "most general use. They are
usually suspended from a wire or rope cable, which may be operated
either by water or by steam; this is supported by a 'single upright
iron column made in sections, which rin into each other, like the
sections of a telescope; it stands under the centre of the car; when
the sections are folded closely together the car is at its lowest position ; on the water being poured into the sections by a steam pump,
the pressure of the water within the column causes the sections to
draw out, thereby forcing the car upward, and so sustaining it.
When a valve is opened, the water escapes, then the weight of the
car and the weight of the upper sections of the column cause the
sections to run into each other, and the car descends.
While the evidence is conflicting as to the efficient working of the
elevator, and the weight thereof induced the jury to find the elevator ought to have been satisfactory, yet we think there is evidence to show the plaintiff in error acted in good faith and not in
mere caprice, in refusing to accept it. We will refer to some. John
Doris testifies that he ran this elevator about a month ; that he would
take it from the first to the sixth floor; it would almost drop from
the sixth to the third floor, and then it would alnost stop, and
then go slowly down ; it acted the same whether the steam pressure was great or small, it would start and jump in getting up to
where we wanted to go; almost every trip it would drop.suddenly
from the sixth to the third floor; if we put on a load itwould jump
all the way up. John Norris, who rode on it four or five times,
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says, "it was jerky, and every little period it gave a little jerk,
causing your stomach to rise." Albert Merritt testified he had
ridden on them, but they were so unsatisfactory and uncertain that
he preferred to walk upstairs; they would stick both going up
and coming down. He had one of the same kind, which he says
-was not entirely completed, although two or three months were occupied in trying to put it in order; he "considers them the biggest
frauds he ever saw in the elevator line." S. Lloyd Wiegand, a me-.
cbanical engineer of twenty-eight years experience, testifies that a
building of moderate height can use them very well; it don't work
well in a tall building." Hale, the architect of the building, rode
on it and saw it often. He says, it did not run smoothly; at the
end of every section it would give a jerk and a click. He examined this and others of the same kind to report to the plaintiff in
error, and" came to the conclusion that it would never do as a passenger elevator on which ladies were to ride." He informed the
ngent of the contractor that the elevator was a failure. Plaintiff
in error also testifies to its jerking and irregular motion, being such
as to scare him, and his fear of an accident; of notice to the agent
that it was unsatisfactory; and of his offer to give 8500 if he *ould
take it out.
It may have been very unwise in tha maker of this elevator to
agree to expend labor and furnish materials and rely for payment
on the uncertain approval of one so largely interested in determining whether it was satisfactory to himself. Having, however,
entered into a contract whereby he did run this risk, his legal
rights are to be determined thereby; 3lefCarren v. JlI.Nulty et al.,
supra. In Nelson v. VFon Bonnhorst, 5 Casey 852, one gave a
written instrument under seal admitting an indebtedness to another
in a specific sum, which he agreed "to pay whenever, in my opinion, my circumstances will enable me to do so." It was held that
the instrument imposed no legal obligation which could be enforced
by action, as the maker was the sole judge of his ability. In that
case there was an unquestioned indebtedness to be discharged by
the payment of money. Every other person might swear the circumstances of the debtor -made him abundantly able to pay, yet
that did not determine his legal liability.
It is claimed that the elevator was rejected before it was finished,
and, if time had been given, it would have been made satisfactory.
If, in fact, it was rejected before it was substantially completed, so
VOL. XX XIV.-3
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that the plaintiff in error could not reasonably determine whether
it was or would be satisfactory to him in all respects, then his rejection was prematurely made, and, under the pleadings, would not
constitute a bar to the action. If, however, it was sufficiently completed so he could understand how it would operate, he was not
bound to wait an unreasonable time for the entire completion of
some minor things.
In so far as the specifications of error are in conflict with this
opinion, they are not sustained.
Judgment reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded.
A high authority, Dr. Wharton, (Contracts sect. 289, note) criticises the bookease .case, cited in the foregoing opinion,
and the case of Atkins v. Barnstable, to
be notieed further on, as going "too far
in leaving the matter to the purchaser's
caprice," -Still we believe that the opinion of MPaCint, C. J., lays down the
reasonable, as well as the actual rule.
For it must be borne in mind that the law
assumes not to make contracts, but to enforce them according-to what the parties
intended, accordingto the ordinary meaning of words. If the parties choose to
make a hard contract, that is their own
lookout.
A word or two more maybe said as to
some of the authorities cited in the principal case.
In Gray v. Railroad the steamboat was
to be taken, "provided upon trial, they
(the purchasers) are satisfied with the
soundness of her machinery."
The plaster-bust case is a very strong
one. The order was taken by the sculptor's agent, who assured Mrs. Clark that
she need not take the bust unless satisMrs. Clark visited the
fied with it.
studio more than once while the work
was in progress, and made some suggestions which the artist carried out. The
lack of proper life-like expression, which
was the objection to the bust, appeared
to be not the artist's fault, but owing to
the nature of the bust as a dead-white
model. Here was a case of capricious

dissatisfaction if ever one there was ; but
as the court pithily said, the contract was
not to make a bust that she ought to, but
one that she would, be satisfied with.
In Brown v. Foster evidence was given
of the custom among tailors, that clothes
should be sent back for alteration if they
did not fit. The defendant was called
upon to try on the clothes in court, and
several tailors testified that a few alterations would make them iight; but the
contract was for a suit to be ready at a
certain day, and the court refused to interfere. Leaving now the cases adduced by
MERcut, C. J., in Atkins v. Barnstable, 97 Mass. 428, one of the cases which
Dr. Wharton objects to, the contract was
for work to be tone "to the acceptance
of the county commissioners." In Bar[ow v. Thompson, 46 Ind. 384, waterwheels were to work to the "entire satisfaction" of the purchaser.
In Harris v. Afiller, 6 Saw. 319,
under an agreement that they should have
a bond "to their -satisfaction," defendants were held to be justified in refusing
plaintiff's own bond, and demanding a
bond with sureties ; but this case is not
as strong as are the others, other circumstances beside the tenor of the contract
rendering a bond with sureties proper.
In an English case, Roberts v. Smith,
4 H. & N. 315, the plaintiff was to be
engaged at a certain salary, as secretary
of a company about to be formed ; in
case the company was not formed he was
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to receive for his time and labor expended',
sucl remuneration as the defendant
might deem right. The company was
not formed, and the plaintiff brought
suit for his compensation. The court
decided that there was no contract such
that he could recover upon, and MAnTIE,
B., said: "The argument that, as a
matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to
be paid, is incorrect; it is by no means
a matter of law that a person shall be
paid for his services-it is a matter of
contract." Other members of the court
alluded to the probability that the plaintiff
was willing to take the chance of losing
allcompensation, to ensure his position
in case the company should be organized.
And on this subject a recent English
author (Pollock on Contracts, p. 44) remarks : "Apromise of this kind, though
it creates no enforceable contract, is so
far effectual as to prevent the promisee
from falling back on any inferred contract to pay a reasonable remuneration."
In llartford Co. v. Bru.h, 43 Vt.
528), the sale was of a patent sugar
evaporator, which the defendant was to
take if he liked it. It was in evidence
that the defendant was sick during most
of the time the apparatus was being
tested, and his objections were derived
from the reports of the workmen under
him. The jury found for defendant, and
their judgment was sustained on appeal,
the court saying that "honesty of purpose," absence of "wilful caprice," or
" dishonorable design" were all that
could be required.
In almost all the
eases this element of good faith is spoken
of as necessary on the part of the party
refusing the article. At this point the
inquiry suggests itself: How is this question of good faith to be determined ? Is
not good faith, like ever-thing else in the
contract, at the option of one 'party?
There is some dirculty here. The best
answer is to be found in the language of
a case which well illustrates the whole
suhject: Daqgett v. Johnson, 49 Vt. 345.
"He (the buyer) must act honestly

and fnh
accordance with tlm reasonable
expectations of the seller as fipliedfront
the contract." (Tie italics are ours-.
The sale in this case was of a setof patent milk-pans, for which the buyer was
to pay "if satisfied with- the pans." The
peculiarity of the pans was that they
were to be used in a certain manner,
with running water about them to graduate the temperature of the milk. The
buyer used them like ordinary pans,
which was of course no test, and then
declared himself dissatisfied with them.
It was adjudged that he must pay for
them. "His dissatisfaction," it was said,
"must be actual-, not feigned." But it
must be presumed from the analogy of
the decisions reviewed in this note, that
if the buyer had used the pans in the
manner the contract contemplated, the
court would not have made inquiry into
the degree or the reality of his objections.
One case only has been found opposing
;his line of decision (Folliard v. Mal'ace, 2 Johns. 395), a contract for the
2urchase of real estate, for which the
layer was to pay after he was well satisfied the title was undisputed and good
against all other claims. Payment was
refused- on the ground of an outstanding
claim of title, but it was shown that this
claim was unsound and the title really
good. Chancellor, then Ch.Justice KENT,
after showing the clearness of the title,
said: "Nor will it do for the defendant
to say he was not satisfied with his title
without showing some lawful ineumbrance or claim existing against it. A
simple allegation of dissatisfaction, with.
out some good reason assigned for it,
might be a mere pretext, and cannot be
regarded. If the defendant were left at
liberty to judge for himself when he was
satisfied, it would totally destroy tie obligation, and the agreement would be abso.
lutely void. * * * This law in this case

will determine for the defendant when he
ought to be sti-flied."
This authority is certainly opposed to
the principal ease, although its force may
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be lessened by the fact that the question
in the case, the title to land, is one which
is peculiarly witlin the power and duty
of a court to determine.
Singerly v. Thayer, and the cases in
accord with it, become clearer when they
are put in contrast with others where the
right of decision is not vested absolutely
and even arbitrarily in a party to the
contract.
The agreement in Cummer v. Butts,
40 Mich. 322, was for selling lumber
on commision, and might be cancelled by
either party "for good cause."
One
party became dissatisfied and ended the
contract. The court below allowed the
question of good cause to go to the jury.
The Appeal Court reversed the judgment
because it was impossible to reduce the
phrase "good cause," to any legal certainty.
In Mueller v. U. S., 19 Court of
Claims 581, the agreement was to furnish building stone "at such times and
in such quantities as may be reiluired by
the government." The government, contemplating a change of plan, broke off
the work, causing heavy loss to the contractor. The court said that the word
required, referred not to the unsettled
purposes of the government, but to the
needs of the work contemplated by the
contract. In other words the working
of the contract conferred no arbitrary
power of refusing the stone.
In McClamroclcv. _lint, 101 Ind. 278,
a mill was sold on condition of return
if it did not "work well." It was held
necessary to state wherein the machine
did not work well, because, as the court
observed, "a defendant who alleges that
a mill or machine does not work well
simply states his own judgment."
See
also Cflark v. Rice, 46 Mich. 308.
Between a case like this and the prineipal case, the distinction is plain. In
the former case the sufficiency of the article, the subject-matter of the contract is
a matter of fact, to he settled as questions
of fact are settled-the case is one of war-

ranty ; inthe Iatter case the sufficiencyof;
the article is left to the judgment, call
it the caprice if you will, of one party
to the contract. It is a question of what
the ordinary meaning of words is. The
word satisfactory, for instance, which
has been found to occur so often, has in
common acceptation a subjective meaning, a reference to the attitude of the
mind towards a thing, and not to the
intrinsic merit of a thing.
t The losing sight of the distinction between a contract, the decision of which
rests with the parties, and one the decision of which devolves upon the court
and jury, is at the bottom of all the troule in the class of cases before us.
The rule laid down in the text covers
the numerous instances of contracts
where the judgment of a supervising
architect or other expert is final as to
work done, as in Dingley v. Greene, 54
Cal. 333; Schenke v. Rowell, 7 Daly
(N. Y.) 286 ; Kane v. Stone Co., 39
Ohio St. I ; Hartupee v. Pittsburgh, 97
Penn. St. 107 ; Kildberg v. UnitedStates,
97 U. S. 398; Sweeneyv. United States,
109 Id. 618 ; Cass v.R ailroad, 0Penn.
St. 31. At least one decision, however,
denies the finality of the architect's decision : THirst v.- Litckfield, 39 N. Y.
377.
A somewhat curious point is decided
in Tetz v. Butterfield, 54 Wis. 242. Th
work was to conform to the specifications, etc., "Iaccording to the full satisfaction of W. D., architect, and to the
satisfaction of the owner." It was considered that the'last clause was meant
only to prevent any change of plan
without sanction of the owner; as to
the quality of the work the architect
alone was to judge.
Another class of cases arises on contracts to build railroads where the amount
of grading, etc., donb is to be estimated
finally by the company's engineer. In
England, no agreement can .hut out the
jurisdiction of equity to correct erroneous statements, while here it is usually
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held that an estimate in: good faith is
final. Scott v. .1,ery, 5 House of Lords
811 ; Berri kev. Railroad, 27 Vt. 673;
Hennessey v. Farrell,4 Cush. 267; Condon v. Railroad, 14- Gratt. 302; Alton
Rd. v. Northcott, 15 Ill.49. One case
at least, however (Kistler v. Railroad,

88 Ind. 460), rules that any agreement
not to resort to legal proccedings is
against the policyof the law. But the
case arose on an under-estlmate of work
done-a simple question of fact.
OH.nLES CIUNCEY SVAGE.
Philadelphia.

9uprenze Court af Indiana.
HEDDERICK

. SMITH.

A tenant who, for the better enjoyment of the leasehold, erects thereon buildings,
may, at any time before his right of enjoyment ceases, remove such buildings, if the
removal can be accomplished without permanent injury to the freehold.
If he neglects to remove them during his rightful continuance in possession, unless
his right to do so afterwards is reserved by agreement with the landlord, he is presumed to have abandoned them, and his right ceases.
If the tenant take a new lease from the landlord without reserving the right to
remove the buildings placed by him on the demised premises for his own enjoyment,
he cannot at the expiration of such new term remove such buildings.
A mere extension, however, of the old lease upon the same terms will not conclude his right to remove such buildings; and the respective rights of the parties
will remain the same.

APPEAL

from the Marion Superior Court.

... Rappaport,for the appellant.
F. S. .Rollins, for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MITCHELL, C. J.-Elizabcth D. Smith, as owner of certain premises in the city of Indianapolis, brought this suit against Hedderick who was in possession, to restrain him from removing
therefrom a "club house," which had been erected thereon, and other
alleged fixtures, which, it was claimed, were a part of the freehold.
The case was put at issue and tried by the court, the result being
a finding and judgment for the plaintiff below. On appeal to the
general term, the only error assigned was that the court, at special
term, erred in overruling thi appellant's motion for a new trial.
Under the settled practice no alleged errors will be considered hiere,
except such as were assigned at the general term : Miller v. Srtat,
61 Ind. 502.
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It is a question whether .the bill of exceptions containing the
evidence is certified by the judge in such manner as to entitle it to
consideration here. But Waivingthe alleged irregularities in that
regard, we find the following undisputed facts exhibited in the evidence. The plaintiff took title to the premises from her deceased
husband, Ebenezer Smith. The place was known as "'Yolks Garden," and had upor it one building-which was used as a saloon, and
The club-house was built by one
another called the "Club-house."
Baldes while occupying as tenant of Smith. In April 1879, Hedderick, with the knowledge and consent of Smith, purchased the
club-house and fixtures of Baldes, paying therefor $700 in cash.
Contemporaneously with the purchase from Baldes, he took a
lease of the premises from Smith for a term of three years.
Whether by the terms of this lease the right to remove the property in dispute was reserved does not appear. During the continuance of this lease Smith died, and his widow succeeded to his
title. At the expiration of the term Hedderick leased the premises
from Mrs. Smith, for the term of one year at a stipulated rent,
payable monthly. The rent reserved for the new term was different
from the old. The lease contained the usual covenants for repair
by the tenant, and for the surrender of the premises at the expiration of the term, without waste. There is in it no reservation of a
right to remove any building or fixtures annexed to or situate upon
the land. Some repairs and alterations were made to the club-room
by the tenant during his term, and ht asserted the right to remove
it and the fixtures which he had purchased from Baldes. Whether
the building was so annexed to the freehold as to become part of it,
or whether it could be removed; without injury to the reversion,
were propositions asserted on one hand and denied on the other.
But as the finding of the court was for the plaintiff, it must be
assumed here that it was. That a tenant who, for the better enjoyment of the leasehold, erects thereon buildings, may, at any time
before his right of enjoyment ceases, remove such buildidgs, if the
removal can be accomplished without permanent injury to the freehold, is well settled. It is equally well settled that if he neglects
to remove them during his rightful continuance in possession, unless
his right to do so afterwards is reserved by agreement with thelandlord, he is presumed to have abandoned them, and his right ceases.
Cromie v. Hoover, 40 Ind. 49; Allen v. Kennedy, Id. 142; Hamilton v. Huntley, 78 Id. 521; Griffin v. Ransdell, 71 Id. 440.
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Assuming that the tenant had the right to remove the building
and fixtures during the continuance of his first term, the question
still remains, what was the effect of his taking a new lease upon
different terms from Mrs. Smith, without reserving any right of
removal ? Without question, if there had been nothing more than
an extension of the 'old lease upon the same terms, the respective
rights of the parties would have remained the same. The acceptance of a new lease upon different terms was, however, the creation
of a new tenancy. It would seem that when the new lease was
made, it was a lease of the whole estate as it then existed, including
the club-house now in dispute, with whatever else was a part of the
freehold. This estate the lessee covenanted to maintain in repair,
and at the expiration of his term surrender up. It results from the
terms of the lease, that whatever constituted a part of the freehold
at the time the lease was accepted must be surrendered at its termination, and the lessee will not be permitted to say that part of the
premises leased was in fact a trade fixture, erected by him under
previous ease, and that he has the right, against the face of his
contract, to sever and remove it. To permit the tenant to do this,
would, in effect, be to permit him to deny the title of his landlord
to part of the demised premises. And if he may deny his title to
a part, why not to the whole? The acceptance of the new lease
was an effectual surrender of the old, together with the estate, and
all other rights which the old lease secured to him. Thenceforth
he was in as of a new estate, which is to be measured by the condition of things existing when it commenced, and by the covenants,
conditions and reservations contained in the new lease, from which
the rights of the parties must be determined and regulated. Upon
this subject the elementary writers are agreed. Accordingly, the
rule is stated by an approved author, thus: "But while a tenant
may remove trade fixtures at any time during his original term, or
any renewal thereof, yet, although he continues in possession after
the expiration of his original term, if he holds under a new lease,
in which no provision for the removal of the fixtures is made, he is
treated as having abandoned his right thereto :" Wood. Landl. and
Ten., § 532. So, also, in Tayl. Land]. and Ten., § 552, the author
says: "If a tenant, at the close of his term, renews his lease, or
surrenders it for the purpose of acquiring a fresh interest in the
premises, he should take care to reserve his right to sever under
the old tenancy ; for when his continuance in possession isunder a
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new lease or agreement, his right to remove fixtures is determined,
and he is in the same situation as if the landlord, being seised with
the land, together with the fixtures, had demised. both to him."
The principles above stated are sustained by the adjudications
of the courts in the following, among other well-considered cases:
Lougqhran v. Ross, 45 N. Y. 792; Watriss v. Pirst Nat. Bank,
&c., 124 Mass. 571; Jungerman v. Bovee, 19 Cal. 355.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
This note will be confined to those
cases touching the time when a tenant
must exercise his right to remove fixtares placed by him on the freehold. If
the tenant has the right to remove the
fixtures, when must he exercise it ?
The reasons for the rule allowing the
tenant to remove the fixtures has been
well stated by Judge CooLY: "The
right of a tenant to remove the erections
made by him in furtherance of the purpose for which the premises were leased
is conceded. The principle which permits it is one of public policy, and has
its foundation in the interest which society has that every person shall be
encouraged to make the most beneficial
use of his property the circumstances will
admitof. On the other hand, the requirement -that-the tenant shall remove during
his term whatever he proposes to claim a
right to remove at all, is based upon a
corresponding rule of public policy, for
the protection of the landlord, and which
is-that the tenant shall not be seffered,
after he has surrendered the premises, to
enter upon the possession of the landlord
or of a succeeding tenant, to remove fixtures which he might and ought to have
taken away before. A regard for the
succeeding interests is the only substantial
reason for the rule which requires the
tenant to remove his fixtures during the
term; indeed, the law does not in strictness require of him that he shall remove
them during the term, but only before he
surrenders possession, and during the
time that he has a right to regard himself as occupying in the character of

tenant :" Kerr v. Kingsbury, 39 Micb.
150; s. c. 33 Amer. Rep. 362; 17
Amer. L. Reg. 638.
The expression " during the term" is
frequently used in the cases, and has its
origin in an early case. Thus in 1804,
in the Year Book, Henry VII. 136, pl.
24,-the rule is stated, "And if the lessee
for years makes such a furnace for his
advantage, or a dyer makes his vats and
vessels to carry on his occupation during
his term, he may remove them; but if
he suffers them to remain fixed to the
earth after the end of his term, then they
belong to the lessor."
So in Pole's
Case, 1 Salk. 368, it was said by Lord
HoLT that "during the term the soapboiler might well remove the vats; but
after the term they become a gift in law
to him in reversion, and are not removable.
In Lyde v. Rusself, I B. & Ad. 394,
Lord

TENTEADEN said: "In

a very

excellent treatise on the law of fixtures
by Mr. Amos and Ferrard (p. 87), it is
laid down that a tenant must use his
privilege in removing fixtures during the
continuance of his term; *for, if he forbear to do so within this period, the law
presumes that he voluntarily relinquishes
his claim in favor of the landlord."
After citing the two cases last cited
above, he proceeded: "According to
these authorities then, the property in
fixtures, which would be in the tenant if
lie
removed them during the term, vests
iii the landlord on the determination of
the term." See also Hallen v. Runder,
1 C., M. & R. 266 ; Lee v. Risdsn, 7

HEDDERICK v. SMIT!.
Taunt. 188; Yackhitosh v. Trotter, 3
3H. & W. 184.
In Weeton v. RP,odcock, 7 3L. & Xr.
1,4, 1t9, ALDiEaSOx, B., said:- "The
rne to- be colleeted from the several
ca-Ci decided on this subject seems to, he
this-that the tenant's right to remove
fixtures continues during his original
term, and during such further period of
possession by him as he holds the premises under a right to consider himself
a. tenant. That was the rule on which.
this court- acted in Mindiall v. L[oyd; 2
MI. & NY. 460, in which PA xE, 13., in
givingi his judgment, puts it on the
ground that there was I no doubt that in
that case the steam-engines were left
affexecI to the freehold after the expiration-of the termv and after the plaintiffshad any right to consider themselves tenants. In the present ease, also, this
boiler was removed, after the entry for
a. forfeiture, and. at a ime after the assignees had ceased to have any right tor
consider themselves as tenants."
In! Nerritt v. Judd, 14 Cal. 59, the
rule is stated in the following language :
"The tenant's right to remove fixtures
continues during his original term, and
during such further period of possession
by him, as-he holds the premises hnder
a right still to- consider himself a tenant;
and, we have seen, beyond this the great
weight of authority does not go :" Citing
Welton v. Woodcock, 7 M. & W. 14.
In Leader v. loinewood, 5 C. B. (N.
S.) 546, Mr. Justice WILLEs, commenting on Weston v. Woodcock, and Penton
v. Robarti 2 East 88; said : 11It irperhaps not easy to understand full- what
is the exact meaning of this rule, and
whether or not it justifies a tenant who
has remained in possession after the end
of his term, and so become a tenant at
sufferance, in severing the fixtures during the time lie continues in possession
as such tenant. But the rule, whatever
its exact meaning may be, is plainly ineonsistent with the argument relied on
by the counsel for the plaintiff in the
VOL. XXXIV.-4

present case, viz. :. that the r Uht of the
tenant continues till he bs evinced. an
intention to abandon his right to the- ixtmes." So- in Mackintosh v. Rottr: a
i. %W. 184, Baron IPAnxE, after stat-

ig whatever is plantedr in the soil belongs to the soil, remarked

" that the

tenant has tie right to remove fixtures
of this nature during his tert, or during
what may, for this purpose, he considered as an excrescence on the term."
And in the Massachusetts case, referring'to these English cases, it was said :

"It is clear from these- eases that the
right of a tenant, in possession after the

end of his ieym, to remove fixtures
within-a reasonable time, does not rest
merely oa the fact that he is in occupa-

fon, or has not evinced an intention toabandor, but because lie is still in contemplation of law, in occupation as tenant under the original lease, and, as
Baron PARxr, says, under what may beconsidered an excrescence on the term,

that is, as tenant at sufferance : Watriss- v. First Nat. Bank of"Cambfidg,
124 sass. 571; s-.c. 26- Amer. Rep.
694.
From these case-, and others to- be
cited, it may be raid down as a general
rule, that so long as the tenant occupies
the premilek previously leasedt under or
by virtue of the lease, during the continuance of which he placed the fixtures
on the demised premises, he may- remove
the fixtures ; but the instant he ceases to
hold the premises under or by virtue of
the lease, his right is at an end.
To this there is an exception. Thus,
"where the teru- is uncertain, or depends upon a, contingency, as where a
party is in as tenant for life, or at will,
fixtures may be removed within a reasonable time after the tenancy is determined :" Wiatriss v. First Not. Bank of
Canibridge, sulre; 1'i.h v. Paige, I
Pick. 4a, 49 ; Duty v. ('orhana, 5 Id.
487, 490; .1frthi v. Roe, 7 E. & B.
237 ; Reynolds v. ,Slwd ,r,5 Cow. 323;
Louylsran v. lRos, 45 N. Y. 792; s. c.
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6 Amer. Rep. 173; Elies v. Mawe,. 3 eluding the buildings, without any reserEast 38; s.c. 2 Smith's L. C. 228-; vation of right, or mention of any claim
Whiting v. Brastow, 4 Pick. 310; -see to the building and fixtures, and occupation under the new letting, are equivalent
Penton v. Robart, 2 East 88.
The taking of a new lease while ir to a surrender of the possession to the
possession under a previous lease has landlord at the expiratiorn of the first
been regarded such a surrender of the term. The tenant is under a new tenpossession that it was a release by the ancy, and not under the old; and- the
tenant of his right to remove the fixtures rights which existed under the former
placed there during such previous lease. tenancy, and which were not claimed or
It is construed as a lease of the freehold exercised, are abandoned as effectually
with the fixtures, especially if the new as if the tenant had actually removed
lease contains any terms different from from the premises, and after an interval
the first lease. In Watriss v. Rirst rat. of time, shorter or longer, had taken
another lease and returned to the premBank of Cambridge, supra, it was said:
"But a very different question is pre- ises. A lease of lands and premises
sented when the same tenant continues carries with it the buildings and fixtures
in possession under a new lease contain- on .the premises, and -the tenant, acceptingdifferent terms andconditions, making ing a lease of the premises without exno reference to the old lease, reserving cepting the buildings, takes a lease of the
no rights to the lessee in fixtures annexed lands with the buildings and fixtures,
during the previous termi and not re- and acknowledges the title of the landmoved before its expiration, and con- ford to both, and is estopped from containing the covenant to deliver up the trovertingit. " See Eten v. Lunster, 60
premises at the end of the term in the N. Y. 252, 261.
In Watriss v. FirstNat. Bank of Camsame condition. This is not the extension of or holding over under an existing bridge, the plaintiff leased the premises
lease; it is creation of a new tenancy. to the .Harvard Bank on January 1st,
And it follows that whatever was a part 1861, for five years at a fixed rent, with
of the freehold when the lessee accepted' the privilege of an additional term of
and began his occupation under the new five years on the same conditions. The
lease must be delivered up at the end of lessee constructed a fire-proof safe or
the term, and cannot be severed on the vault and placed other fixtures on the
ground that it was put in as a trade fix- premises. The lessee (the bank) was
ture under a previous lease which has afterwards changed into a national bank
expired. The failure of the lessee to under the name above given. The new
exercise his right to remove during the bank elected to extend the lease as above
former term, or to reserve it in his new stated, and continued in occupation until
contract, precludes him from denying the October 7th, 1870, when a new lease was
tide of his landlord to the estate, and entered into by the parties for five years
the fixtures annexed which have become from January 1st, 1871, at an increased
part of it. The occupation under the rent, and the new lease contained the
new lease is in effect a surrender of the same provisions as the old one, with an
premises to the landlord under the old."
additional covenant in case of fire, that
In Loughran v. Boss, supra, it was the rent was to cease until the repairs
said : "The surrender of the premises, were completed. About November 8tb,
after the expiration of the lease, is such 1875, the defendant (the bank) removed
an abandonment as vests the title in the the safe and fixtures. Under these facts
landlord. In reason and principle the it was held that such remnual was unlawacceptance of a lease of the premises, in- ful.
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Other cases on a similar state of facts
are, decided in tile
.ame way: MTna'ks"
v. Rytor. -I Cal. 107 ; Jungernutn v.
Bovee, I:. 1.1345; Abell v. Wiliams,
3 DaIs . .LDeeft v. McMullen, 8 Ir.
Cor. L. ;Z5 F-Shepard v. Spauldint, 4

Met. 416; Darrah. v. Baird, 40- LegInv. 121 ;-s. c-22 Amer. L. Reg. 533.
See generally, Thomes v. Crouti 5- Bush
37; Dingley v. Buffulm, 57 'Me. 381;
Y.oungblood v-.harris, 68 Ga. 63G.
A lessee-, who- had erected fixtures for
the-purposes of trade upon the-demised
premises, and afterwards took a. new
lease to commence at, the expiration of
his former one, which new Rease contained. a covenant to repairit-was said,
was bound to repair those fixtures unless
strong, circumstances existed to show
that they were not-intended to. pass
under the general words of the sepond
demise. Thresher v..ast London Mater-Works, 2 B. & C. 608.
A suit in ejeetment was commenced
February 8th; on the 19th the defendant
allowed judgment to go by defiault upon
the lessor of the plaintiff entering into
the following agreement: c' In consideration ofMessrs. J. & G. B. [the tenants],
not appearing in- this action, I hereby
undertake not to issue a writ of possession until after tile 25th day of A'arch
next." I was held that the defendants
were, by the agreement, precluded from
removing-fixtures put up by- them on the
premises, in the interval between Februarv 19th-and March 25th, the fair construction of tile agreement being that-the
premises should-be given up in the same
state that they- were, in on the day tle
judgment was signed. Reap v. Barton,
12 C. B. 274; s. . 16 Jur. 891.
Pitzherbertv. Shfav, 1 H. BL 258, is
considered one or the leading cases on
liis subject. There the purclaser of land
brought an ejeetmeut suit against tie
tenant from year to year, and tile parties
entered into 1n agreement that judgment
shoulM T si.-ii'd fir the plaintiff with a
stay of execution mitil a given period.

It was hcht tiat the tenant- could not in
the interval remove "fixtures fi'onthe
premnises. which-fihe
had himself erectedi
during his term, and before the" action
was broughtA telantat will of a lessee of land
erected a small building on .the land
restiug on-stone p6sts sunk il thegrounrd.

The buildiug was creeted-with th-knq wledge and consent of tile lessor of the
ground, and with the understanding on

his part, and on that of tie tenant at
will, that it would be removed as!a trade
fixture. Both tenancies expired at tie
same-time, and neither tenant removed
tie buildings
tile lessor resumed po.-

sssion of the premises, and soon, after
tle former tenant at will hired it with
other land at airincreased rent. It was
held: that the tenant at will could not,

after-this, remove the buildi'ng.

Mckrer

v. Estabrook, 134-Mass. 55G.
Tile doctrine of the principal ease has

not always been followed : Me,", v.
Kingsbury, 39 3ieh. 1.50; s.c. 3a Am.
Rep. 362, is a. notable instance of this
dissent. In that ease the-followirg reasoning was used, after referring to the
general rule that tie fixture must be.

removed before the term expires or possession: is given: "But why the right
should he lost when the tenant, instead of
surrendering possession, takes a renewal
of his lease is notvery apparent. There
is certainly no reason ofpublic poliey to
sustain -such a doctrine; on tile contrarv, the reasons which saved to the ten.
ant his right to the fixtures in the first
place are equally influential to save him
on a renewal what was unquestionably
his before. What could possiblybe more
absurid thian a rule of law which should
in effect say to the tenant who isabaut
to obtain a renewal - 'If you will be at
the expcn s
ncl trouble, anodien.ur the
loss, of rcUillA'ig your crectilol dlriutg
it term, and or

irtd

ueui in-

them !,at.,
again, tht.,shaoll
I., volurs ;
othlrwi-V :.'oul
will lie,heciloi to(4)'a
1did,d."
dull thcnll tk. vi'lur

HEDDEAICK v. SMIITH
This was a case where the new lease.
was accepted from a new landlord, and
it.was held that the tenant was not prohibited from removing trade fixtures
placed on the-premises during the continu-ance in force of the first lease ; and the
court cites the language used in Daiis v.
Moss, 38 -Penn. St. 346, 353, where it
is said, "if a tenant remains in possession after the expiration of his term, and
performs all the conditions of the lease, it
amounts to a renewal of the lease from
year to year, and I take it he would be
entitled to remove fixtures during the
year." To the same effect is Devin v.
Dougherty, 27 How. Pr. 458.
If the first lease is a written one, and
the second only in parol, the effect upon
the right to remove the fixtures is the
same : Loughran v. Ross, supra.
An exception to the general rule, that
the tenant must remove the fixtures during
the term, has already been noted. In
one case it was said of this rule, "to
apply it to a party in possession under a
lease revocable at pleasure, would be
manifestly unjust and without reason.
It would be allowing a party, without
any fault of his own, or any opportunity
of removal, to be deprived of his property at the mere will and caprice of
another:" Northern Cent. Ry. Co. v.
Canton Co., 30 Md. 347-; s. c. 8 Am.
L. Reg. 540. So that where a landlord
agreed to sell a trade fixture for the tenant's benefit, and the tenant left it after
the expiration of his time, and the landlorff failed to sell it, it was held that the
tenant bad a reasonable time, after the
term, to remove it, and that his creditors
had the same- right of attachment: Torrey v. Burnett, 9 Vroom 457 ; s. c. 20Am. Rep. 421.

So, where a lease was given by an
agent without sufficient authority during
the absence-of the owner, and-was, terminated by the owner on his return
from abroad, it wag decided that the
tenant became a tenantvat sufferance, and
could remove his fixtures within a reasonable time after such termination: Antoni
v. Belknap, 102 Aass:193.
So the same is true in case of a forfeiture of a lease : Weeton v. Woodcock,
6 M_ & W. 14.
Likewise if the landlord, before the
expiration of the term, enjoins the tenant from removing his fixtures, the tenant
will be allowed a reasonable time after
the dissolution of the injunction within
which to - demand and remove them:
Goodman v. Hannibal 6- St. Joseph Rd.
Co., 45 Mo. 33.
Certain premises were let for no certain time, for a nursery, for raising trees
and plants until ready to be transplanted.
It was ruled that the trees must be removed within a reasonable Time after
the lease was terminated : King v. Wilcombs, 7 Barb. 6&; and if the term is
certain, then before possession is yielded:
Brooks v. Galster, 51 Barb. 196.
But where the lease is thus unexpectedly terminated, it would seem that the
fixtures must be removed beforeposses.
sio is yielded, else the effect will ha an
abandonment: Lerader v. Homewood, 5
C. B. (N. S.) 546; Gibson v. The
Bammersmitl Rd. Co., 32 L. J. Ch.
337, 342; Heap v. Barton, supra;
Martin v. Roe, supra.; Weeton v. Woodcock, supra. See Smmer v. Brmilou,
U L. J., Q. B. 130 ; Minshall v. Lloyd,
2 M. & W. 450.
W. W. TonxToi.
Crawfordsville, Ind.
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B. ff. Farrarand E. B. I ruttscil-tt,

for complainants.

Ohas. B. Singleton, RichctrdHf. Brown,. and B. F. C ocde, for
defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARDEE, J.-The suit is hrought to restrain the Home Insurance
Company from reducing its capital stock. The question is one. of
the power of the company, and not of the propriety of its- proposed
action. It is welt-settled corporation law, "that a corporation has!
no implied authority -to alter the amount of its capital stock where
the charter has definitely fixed the capital at a certain sum. The
shares of a corporation can neither be increased: nor diminished in
number, or in their nominal value, unless this be expressly authorized by the company's charter." Morawetz Priv. Corp., § 230. See
Tayl. Priv. Corp., § 133; Green's 1hice's Ultra Vires-158;
GWamf/er's LifC IRS. Cko. v- .famler, 73 AIa. 325. And it is understood that the same law prevails in Louisiana. See Percy v.
MIilandon, 3 La. 5G9. Article 239 of the constitution of Louisiana
prohibits increase of stock of corporations, except in pursuance of
general laws. See, also, act 26th of 1882, of the Laws of Louisiana,
specifically providing the mode and manner by which the stock of
corporations may be increased. See, also, section 6W3, hev. St. La.
From these Louisiana authorities it seems clear that the authority
to increase the capital stock of a corporation must be express. It
would also seem that, as the constitution and the law thereunder
provide for the increase 6f the stock, but are silent as to a decrease,
the power to decrease the stock of a corporation was intentionally
denied.
All the authorities examined, and the nature ,)f thingIs, are to the
effect that. a decrease of capital stock affects i-.juriouslh I-re parties
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and interests than would an increase; increase of capital being
generally considered to be beneficial to shareholders and creditors
alike-to the former as tending to diminish and not to add to their
individual risks ; to the latter as increasing the amount of their
security. See Green's Brice's Ultra Vires 160.
In Percy v. Millaudon, supra, Judge MRTin, speaking of the
attempted reduction of the capital of the Planters' Bank, says :
" Creditors and customers have a claim to the preservation of the
capital in its original integrity, for the faith of which they accept
the notes of the institution, deposit their money, and lodge paper
for collection. So has the public, on account of the advantages
which the legislature has stipulated the bank should afford, as a
consideration for the-immunities and privileges which the charter
confers. So have the stockholders, on account of the profits which
they have a right to expect on the inyestments they have respectively made."
I do not understand counsel for defendant to seriously deny that
the authority to increase or decrease the amount of capital stock of
a corporation must be express; but he claims that to corporations
created under the general law, as the Home Insurance Company
was, the power to increase or diminish stock is given by section 687,
Rev. St. La., which reads:
"It shall be lawful for the stockholders. of any corporation, at the
general meeting convened for that purpose, to make any modifications,, additions, or changes in their act of incorporation, or to dissolve it with the assent of three-fourths of the stock represented at
such meeting; any such modification, addition, change, or dissolution shall be recorded as required by the preceding section."
And he contends that his construction of the powergiven in said
section has been sanctioned by long-continued practice and usage
among the corporations of the state, and the case proves that a number of leading insurance companies in the city of New Orleans, under
such construction, have either increased or decreased their capital
stock. Some have done both. The legislative construction of section 687 can be found in the proviso of section 693, "provided that
nothing in this act shall be so construed as to authorize an increase
in the capital stock of any railroad company." The judicial construction should be found in the reports of adjudged cases, but an
examination of the Louisiana Reports shows no case where the
question has been raised. It is a fair inference, then, that in every
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case where there has been an increase or decrease of capital stock,
under authority claimed to be given by section 687, there has been
unanimou- ,onsent of stockholders and creditors, which makes a
very diffe .,a case from the present one.
While ti

*

Louisiana courts have not been- called on to determine

whether an increase or decrease of the capital- stock of a. corporation
is within the scope of section 687, and there are few if any cases
from sister states, the English courts have construed similar provisions against the claimed authority.
In Smith v. Goldsworthy, 4 Adol. & E. (,{. S.) 4!0, it was held
that a provision "that for the better conduct and management of
the affairs of the company, it should be lawful for a special general
meeting called for the purpose, from time to time, to amend, alter,
or annul, either wholly or in part, all or any of the clauses of the
said deed, or of the existing regulations and provisions of the company," did not authorize a. reduction of the number and value of
the shares of the company. See, also, Droitwicl Patent Salt Co.
v. Curzon, L. R., 3 Exch. 35; I;n re Ebw Vale Steel, etc., Co., 4
rs
re FinaneialCorporation, (Holmes' Case), L. R.,
Ch. Div. 827;
2 Oh. 714 ; Society v.. Abbott, 2 Beav. 559. For American cases,
see Granger'sLife Ins. Co. v. Kamper, 73 Ala. 325 ; S alem Mill
Dan v. Ropes, 6-Pick. 23.
The power to dissolve does not carry the power to change the capital stock. Reducing the capital stock is practically the dissolution
of the company and the organization of a new company. It did appear to me on the hearing that the proposed action of the home
company was not a reduction of the capital stock, for the capital
and assets of the company are to remain the same. It seems that
since the organization the capital has been nominal, to the extent
that only by estimation has the actual capital of the company been
equal to the par value of the shares, and tie proposed action now is
but to write off the par value of the shares so that the par value and
the estimated value may be equal, the actual capital not being
affected-the actual stock being the same after the proposed action
as before. It seems clear to me that the writing off the value of
shares is sueli an infringement of the rights of property as can only
he accnpislied by consent. or a clear power given in the charter.
However, I have concluded to treat the case as the parties have presented it, an'l not from this latter view. It seems perfectly clear
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to me that the proposed action of the Home Insurance Company
cannot be lawful over the protest of dissenting stockholdersThe injunction issued in the case will be perpetuated in the
decree.
Reductions of capital stock of a cor
poration are not so common as increases
thereof. Nevertheless there are a few
cases in point.
In Snzfit v. Goldsworthy, 4 Q. B. 4301;
12 L. J., Q. B. 192, the deed of settlement of a company incorporated by a
special act declared, that it should be
lawful for "a special general meeting to
amend, alter or annul, either wholly or
in part, any or all of the existing provisions of the deed, and to make any
new or other regulations in lieu thereof;
and such new regulations should " "be
binding and conclusive upon the shareholders." The deed provided that the
capital should be 2,000,0001., divided
into 20,000 shares of 1001. By resolutions, passed and confirmed at meetings
duly convened and holden, it was resolved that the capital should be reduced
to 1,000,0001, in 501. shares. The Court
of Queen's Bench held that such reduction was ultra vires of the company.
D NiAN,
.
'C. J., said : "The amount
of shares is properly part of the constitution of the company, and does not
strictly depend upon any clause, resolution or provision of the deed. The alteration of shares seems, therefore, not
to come within the meaning of the 29th
clause (above quoted). * * * The defendant further argues that the effect
of
the resolution reducing the shares was to
dissolve the company. Sire
do not think
any such effect followed, but rather that
they were simply void and inoperative.
We think the shares always were, in
point of law, 100!. shares."
A similar conclusion is reached in
Droiwich Suit co. v. Curzon. L. R., 3
Ex. 42. In this case the capital stock
was partially paid, and it was undertaken to reduce the nominal capital to

the sum actually paid. KELLY, 0, B.,
in-refusing to permit the reduction, said:
"If such a proceeding were permitted,
the shareholders' liability would be limited not, as was intended, by the amount
of their shares, but by the amount of the
already paid up portion of their shares.
Justice, the language of the act and the
intention of the legislature, alike forbid
an interpretation which would lead to
such a result." It was further decided
in this case, that if a new company,
formed under a general incorporation
act, could not, under that act, reduce its
capital stock, an old one coming in to
share the benefits of such act could not
do so.
In re Ebbw Vale S. L 4- C. Co., 4
Ch. Div. 829, arose under the English
Companies Act of 1867, which empowered a company to reduce its capital, and
required the reduction to be confirmed by
order of -court, and to be registered, &e.
The nominal capital of the company was
divided into shares of 321. each, all of
which were subscribed for. On all the
shatres (except a few which were paid in
full) 291. per share was paid, leaving 31.
per share to be called up. The capital
having been partially lost through the
depreciation of the property which represented it, the company-desired to write
off the loss, and for that purpose proceeded to take steps under the companies
act for reducing their nominal capital.
They accordingly resolved that the nominal capital should be reduced to a specified amount, and that each 321- share
should be reduced to 231. by the extinction of 91. per share, to the intent that
the existing liahitity of 31. per .share on
all the shares except those fully paid,
should be preserved, that is, the new
shares were to be deemed full paid to
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the extent of 201., leaving the 31. still
due.
The applh'ation was refused on the
ground tlht, ;- the nominal liability
of the stoch ,I !,-r., namely the 31. per
,hare unpail r. uincd still due, there
was finfact no reduction of the nominal
capital. JvssLm, M. R., said : "Now,
first of all, what does 'reduce its capital' (in the statute) mean, standing
alone ? I should think it meant an
actual reduction. This is not an actual
reduction because the capital has been
lost. It is merely acknowledgiug that to
be lost which is lost ; 9!. per share is
lost; 31. per share remains to be paid
up, and the company wish that 31. to be
still called up. All they want is towrite off 91. per share at; loss. That is
not reduction of capital; part of the
capital has gone already; it has- been
reduced by a very unpleasant process.
It requires no resolution of tile company
to do that :'" In re .Ebbw VTale S.. L
C. Co., 4 Ch. Div. 832.
In Tn re Financial Corporatiorn,L. R., 2
Oh. 714, the memorandum of association
of a company provided that the capital
should be 3,O00,0001. divided into
30,000 shares of 1001. each, " subject
to be increased or modified," and the
articles gave the board of directors
power to divide the shares into shares
of smaller amount. The directors exercised such power, and converted each
1001. share into five 201. shares. f1eld,
that such conversion was unauthorized
and void, as not being autirized by the
companies act.
It is, however, sometimes desirable
that the capital stock of a corporation
should be reduced. Accordingly, provision therefor has heen made in some
states hy statute. Sec New York Statutes, for example (chapter 26"4, Laws
1878, N. Y.), providing in su!,.tance
that whenever any company shall de,ire
to call a meeting for ' - diminishing the
amount of its capital stock, notice shall
be nmhlished and served ; a vote of twoVOL. XXXIV.-5

thirds ofal[ the shares of stock shall be necessary ; it certificate shall be made and
verifi,.d showing(lt),thefiimountofcapitat
actmndly paid in ; (2-), the amount ofdebts
ant liabilities ; (3), the amount towlich
tle capital stock shall be diminished;
which certificate must he filed-, with tie
approval of the comptroller, to the effect
(1), that the reduced capital is enough
for the corporate purposes; (2), that it.
is in excess- of all debts and. liabilities of
the company, exclusive of debts secured
by mortgage, and (3), that the actual
market value of tile stock before reduction was less than par. It will be observed that the objects sought to be
obtained hy this-enactment were the protection of corporate creditors au the assurance of a fund sufficient to carry out
the corporate purposes, and that it permitsa reduction where either it was originallyfixed at too high a sum orhas become
impaired- so that the nominal exceeds
tie actual sum. But it does not permit
the distribution among stockholders of a
sum equal to the difference between the
nominal and the reduced-capital, although
if that sum may be taken outandyetleave
capital of the company unimpaired and
the creditors secure, it may be divided
among shareholders as a surplus entitled
to be distributed in dividends. Strong
v. Brooklyn Cross T. Rd. Co., 93 N. Y.
426.
And a statute (Gen. Stat. N. H., chap.
354, sect. 6) which authorizes a corporation, at any meeting called for the purpose, to reduce its capital stock and the
number of shares therein, does not empower such corporation- to effect such
reduction by purchasing shares of a particular subscriber ; unless a course is
adopted which will work exact and even
justice to all the owners of stock, the
statute i' inoperative : Crrier v. Lebanon Sl,,e (,.. 56 N. 11. 262 ; see also
Gill v. Ijalis. 72 Mo. 424:
'7etlainv.

lepblic Lit", Ins. C,,., 86 II1. 220; see
also llcnuylvania Statute of 29th Aiil
1874. sect. 23, P. L. 83.
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There are not many cases learing
directly on the decrease of corporate
stock. But there is a large number
where such stock has been increased,
and the validity of the proceeding has
been passed upon. Incidentally, some
of these cases discuss reduction of capital
stock. And it iswell settled that neither
increase nor decrease of capital stock is
within the power of the company, except

where authority so todo is expresslyconferred. See -. Y. 4- N. H. Rd. Co. v.
Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30; Knowlton v.
Congress, etc., Co., 14 Blatch. 364; 103
U. S. 49; Railway Co. v. Alerton,
18 Id. 235; Oldtown Rd. Co. v. Veazie,
39 Me. 571 ; Spring Co. v. Knowlton,
103 U. S. 49 ; 57 N. Y. 518.
ADELuERT HIAMLTON.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. BOARD OF COUNCILMEN OF THE
CITY OF DETROIT.
A statute providing for the appointment in a city of a board of four commissioners
to,take charge of elections, two members thereof to be selected from each of the two
leading political parties of.the city, such board to appoint registers and inspectors of
eleetfon from each of the two leading political parties is unconstitutional, as requiring
an .unlawful test for the holding of a public office.
Party representation being the main object of such a law, the court cannot treat it
as not esential nd sustain the commission by allowing the selection of its members
without such.a test.
The creation by statute of a board of commissioners for a city, having control of
all the municipal elections and the appointment of election officers, is unconstitutonal, as being Adelegation of governmental powers and in violation of the settled
principle that all officers eixercising powers of government and control over municipal
affaia must derive .their power and office either from the people directly or from the
agenus or representtives of .the people.

APpLICATIoN for mandamus.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.--The attorney-ge neral applies for a mandamus to
compel the respondents to take action upon certain nominations
made by the mayor of Detroit- of for persons, two being Republicans and two being Democrats, to act as , board of commissioners
of registration and of election for the city of Petroit, Respondents
refused to consider the nominations because they regarded the
statute which provides for such hoard as unconstitutional and
invalid. To an order to show cause they interpose that ground of
defence. No other question is of nuch importance in the case.
The necessity of an immediate decision, in order to allow time for
the action of the city authorities in season for the coming election,
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made it impossible for the court to do more than announce its determination, on rendering judgment in favor of respondents, as any
oral statement in brief form of the grounds of their action would
have been liable to some misapprehension. It was therefore thought
best that the members of the court should express their views more
formally in writing. The statute in question purports ta amend
chapter 2 and some sections of chapter 3 of the charter of Detroit,
as revised in 1883. Chapter 2, which refers to the- registration of
voters, is entirely superseded by the present act, as is also so much
of chapter 3 as provided for the choice of inspectors of election.
The new statute undertakes to provide a board. of commissionefs to
appoint ward registers and inspectors, who are to perform the
duties formerly imposed on the boards made up of aldermen and
their appointees, and of persons elected by the voters. The board
thus provided for is required to be composed of four members holding
office for four years, the first board being appointed for onetwo, three
and four years respectively, so that one vacancy shall be filled each
year. They are all to be resident electors of the city, and two
members thereof to be from each of the two leading political parties
of the said city. They are required, two weeks before the time
fixed by law for the meeting of boards of registration- of voters, to
appoint two qualified electors of each voting district, one from each
of the two leading political parties of the said city, to act as registers,
and form a district board of registration. The various district
boards, sitting together, are to constitute a city board of registration. The board of commissioners are to fill any district vacancies
by persons of the same political party to which the absentee belongs.
The commissioners are also required to appoint for each voting
district two inspectors, one from each of the two political parties
"represented in the- common council of said city," the electors
choosing a third- Vacancies in any board of inspectors are to be
filled by viva voce vote of the electors, but each vacancy must be
filled by a person of the same politicai party as the absentee. The
commissioners also appoint the various clerks of election, but have
no immediate part in the work of registration by action or supervision.
The statute makes a number of new provisions upon the subject
of registration and election, which were more or less discussed on
the argument, but which would only be important if the law were
:ot held to be entirely invalid, as we deem it to be. These several
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provisions will not, therefore, be dwelt upon. The invalidity of the
statute was chiefly based on the argument upon the illegality of
creating a board with such powers as those conferred by the statute,
and required to be composed of equal numbers of two political parties appointed as such members, and ineligible without such party
connection. Relator insists that the legislsture, under its power to
pass laws to preserve the purity of elections and guard, against
abuses of the elective franchise, has discretionary power over the
methods, and that, even if the partisan disqualification is improper,
the court may treat it as not essential and sustain the commission
by allowing the selection of its members without any such test.
Neither of these grounds is tenable, in our view of the constitution.
In order to appreciate the bearing of the considerations presented
on the case, it will be necessary to make some reference to the
general elective system of the constitution itself. It is needless to
explain that under that system, the whole scheme of government, in
every department, depends upon the action of the qualified voters
in their electoral districts. All male citizens of lawful age, and
some whose United States citizenship is incomplete, are entitled
after a certain term of residence to vote in the township or wards
in which they reside. Every vote, for any purpose whatever, is
required to be cast in such township or ward. The only exception is in
case of soldiers in the field during the war. All legislation imposing restraint or conditions upon voting must conform to the other
clauses and provisions of the constitution. No part of that instrument can be allowed to override or destroy any other part. It is
also well settled that our state polity recognises and perpetuates
local government through various classes of municipal bodies, whose
essential character must be respected, as fixed by usage and recognition when the constitution was adopted; and any legislation for
that purpose which disregards any fundamental and essential requisites of such bodies has always been regarded as invalid and unconstitutional. There is nothing in the constitution which permits the
legislature, under the desire to purify elections, to impose any conditions which will destroy or seriously impede the enjoyment of the
elective franchise. And as the right of voting is the same everywhere, it is obvious that the conditions regulating the manner of
exercising it must be the same in substance everywhere. The machinery of the government differs in its details in cities, villages,
and townships, and of course in methods and officers to administer
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tie election laws. But it cannot be lawful to create substantial or
serious differences in the fundamental rights of citizens of different
localities- in the exercise of their voting franchises.
It is also a most important principle under our constitutional
system that no one shall be affected in any of his legal and political
rights by reason of his opinions on political subjects or other matters
of individual conscience. The political right to freedom of belief
and expression is asserted in the most distinct way, and applies to
every privilege which the constitution confers. No one has ever
supposed that any new condition could be added to those which the
constitution has imposed on the right of suffrage, beyond such as are
necessary to guard against double voting, or to prevent its exercise
by those who are not legal voters. The only legitimate object of
registration laws is to secure a correct list of actually qualified
voters. Any attempt to inquire into the sentiments of the voters
is not only an abuse, but one which it is the chief purpose of the
ballot system to prevent. The ballot is a constitutional method
which cannot be changed, and its perpetuation means the security
to vote without any inquisition into the voter's opinion of men or
measures ; and it would be entirely meaningless if the voter's
choice of candidates for any office must be made from any particular
party or number of parties. But the constitution has made this
more specific (although this was hardly necessary), by providing, after
giving the form of an official oath, that "no other oath, declaration
or test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust."
It is manifest that any important function of government comes
under one or the other of these heads of" office" or "public trust."
The board of registration commissioners consists under this statute
of persons holding permanent offices.
The district registrars,
clerk and inspectors perform functions connected with the most vital
and important action of citizens in their capacity as choosers of the
officers of government. The constitutional rule covers them all, literally as well as impliedly.
It was urged on the argument that if the term " test" can be
held applicable to inquiries into party affiliation, it is equally applicable to those other qualifications often required for public service,
such as education, scientific .acquirements in surveyors and other
specialists, legal knowledge in law officers, and the like. But this is
not so. Not only is it evident from the other provisions in - this
,:aute that all the exemptions referred to are such a-5 would be appli-
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cable in all sorts of offices, but the use of the word " test" is especially significant, because its recognised legal meaning in our constitution is derived from the English test acts, all of which related
to matters of opinion, and most of them to religious opinion.
Such has been the general understanding of the framers of constitutions. If this were not so, and if the power of the legislature
in imposing conditions of office is at the same time only restrained
by express clauses applying in terms to officers and to no one else,
it would not be difficult for any dominant party controlling the
legislature to perpetuate its power until overthrown by revolution.
But such discriminations are as repugnant to the rights of voters
in selecting as to the rights of those chosen in assuming office, and
this clause is but an additional assertion of a principle found in
other parts of the constitution, expressed or clearly implied. In
the case- of -People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, it was not disputed
by any of the judges who referred to the matter, that it would not
be lawful to confine the choice of officers to particular parties,
although two of the judges thought that the provision" in that particular case was capable of being eliminated from the statute. And
it is claimed, in' the present case, that the present law is declared
and intended to be non-partisan, and that the board may be chosen
without reference to this restriction of party membership.
It is altogether likely that the framers of the law were of opinion
that the evils of partisan action, and the temptation to carry it to
abusive extremes, would be lessened by requiring that one party
should not monopolize the offices, but that two should share them.
No one can doubt the advantage of impartiality in public action.
But parties, however powerful and unavoidable they may be, and
however inseparable from popular government, are not and can not
be recognised as having any legal authority as such. The law can
not regulate or fix their numbers, or compel or encourage adherence to them. Many good citizens form no permanent party ties,
and when elections are close, the effort of each party is to detach
votes from the friends of the other. Where there are two parties
larger than any other, the success of either is very often gained by
coalition with a -third one. In local matters party allegiance is not
uncommonIy laid aside for the time being, so that it cannot be said
that any party is represented in the election. However tell meant
such a statute as that before us may be, it distinctly makes party
adhesion a condition of office; and not only so, but it puts all but
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the two favored parties beyond the possibility of reprcsentation, if
the law is obeyedIt is oe tally clear that this party representation is the essential
purpose . the law- and that the other changes are merely subsidiarv. There are some chaunges in detail, but the main purpose
can not be mistaken. The partisan qualifications are made emphatic in regard to all the offices. It is impossible for any candid
person to read the act and believe that the real legislative design
can be carried out, by leaving the councilmen and mayor at
liberty to choose commissioners from a single party, or for the
commissioners te appoint registers and inspectors without distinction of party, at their pleasure, and it would needl no great-sagacity to see that if such unlimited power were vested in a body
made up as this body might thea be constituted, all of the old
evils would remain, and would be made worse by the absence of
any responsibility to the voters of the precincts.
In my judgment, the creation of a board with such- powers as
are given to this board. is quite as serious an infringement of the
constitution as the partisan clauses, and much more dangerous.
This board is made by the statute the repositary of some of the
most important powers of government. It has the entire control,
directly or indirectl, of the elections on which all the departments
of government depend. It has the appointment of officers who can
deprive any man of his vote at any election, if they see fit to do so,
without any adequate means of redress to save it. While it is
unavoidable that a voter's rights at election must, in case of dispute, be disposed of summarily, it is all the more necessary that
the tribunal which decides on so sacred a right should be made up
in harmony with representative and popular institutions.
While boards are not uncommonly created for the more convenient management of the business interests of the municipalities, it
is a principle universally settled in our system that all officers and
functionaries exercising power of government and control over
political action must derive their power and office either from the
people directly, or from the agents or representatives of the people.
The officers of towns an d cities have always been so created. The
discretion of a political body or functionary can not be delegated
and sub-delegated indefinitely. Here the choice of ward officers is
made, not by the people of the ward. nor by the cl,cii officers of
tL. city, but by persons who arc themselves appointees of a part
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of the city government. No doubt there are many ministerial
powers which can be deputized. But a governing body cannot
deputize others to perform the governing functions, and the legislature cannot authorize it to do so without destroying the character
of the corporation which is required to be preserved. It has
always been held in this state that the municipalities which can be
created by our legislature must be such in substantial character as
they have been heretofore known. Up to this time, and ever since
elections were first held in Michigan, they have been not only
localized in some municipal division, but regarded as municipal
action, and supervised and managed by municipal officers, either
directly elected, or else appointed by those who have been elected
Such a board as this, which is in no sense a mere agency of the
city, is foreign to our system. If it can be created in a city, it
can just as well be created in a county,. or for the state. When the
election ceases to be a. municipal procedure, the whole foundation
of municipal government drops out. And a municipality which is
not managed by its own officers is not such a one as our constitution recognises.
As the defects which have led to a refusal of a mandamus in this
case invalidate the whole law, there is no occasion to consider anything else. In my opinion either of them is fatal.
CHiAPLIN and SHERWOOD, JJ., concurred.
MORSE, 0. J.-The ostensible primary object of the law under
consideration was to preserve the purity of elections and throw
additional safeguards around the ballot-box. Such a law should be
sustained, unless in plain violation of the letter or spirit of the
constitution. Every good citizen, regardless of political belief or
party action, ought to and does desire that the right of suffrage
shall be amply protected against hindrance or obstruction to the
legal voter, as well as against the fraudulent exercise of the elective
franchise. The security and permanency of good government also
depend upon it. We can take judicial knowledge, I think, that political corruption exists, and that there has been, and is liable to be, a
dishonest depositing and an unfair counting of ballots. There is
no doubt but legislation is needed to protect and purify the exercise
of this, one of the highest privileges of the citizen. The constitutionality of this act, which is in the form of an amendment to the
charter of the city of Detroit, was attacked upon the argument in
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this court upon four grounds, namely: (1 That it is in conflict
with the provision of the constitution that '"no law shall embrace
more than one ohject, which shall be expressed in its title. (2)
That it violates another provision of the constitution, to wit: "No
law shall be revised or altered or amended by reference to its title
only: but the act revised, and the section or sections of the act
alteret or amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length."
(3) The form of registration prescribe(I is not in harmony with the
constitutional qualifications of electors in this state. (4) The act
is wholly void because of the political tests or qualifications of the
registration and inspection of officers.
I am not satisfied that the two first objections are tenable.
As to the third objection, while I believe the form prescribed not
applicable to our election laws, and one that would do- more harm
than good, creating confusion instead of certainty, and having a
tendency to hamper and perhaps to prevent the exercise of the
elective privilege by the legal voter in certain cases, and therefore
unconstitutional, yet, under the rule uniformly applied to statutes,
it would not defeat the operation of the remainder of the law; as 1
regard the form of registration rather as an incident to, than as the
main principle of, the act.
The fourth objection to the law, it seems to me is fatal. The act
provides, in substance, that the board of councilmen of the city,
upon the nomination of the mayor, shall appoint a board of commissioners of registration and election in and for the city of Detroit,
who shall consist of four resident electors, and whose term of office
shall be four years. This board of commissioners have placed
wholly in their hands the appointment of the district boards of registration in every voting precinct in the city. They have also the
absolute power of appointment of two of the three election inspectors
in every voting district, leaving the electors the poor privilege of
choosing the other upon the opening of the polls. Besides defining
the powers of said boards of commissioners, registration and election inspectors, the law prescribes the following qualifications of
these officers, as follows: "1st. Said board" (of commissioners)
"shall be strictly non-partisan in character, two members thereof
to be from each or the two leading political parties in said city.
2d. One of said registrars " (district board of registration' "to be
from each of the two leading political parties in said city. 3d. One
inspector " (of elections) "so appointed, to be from each of the
VOL. XXXIV.-6
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two political parties represented in the common council of said
city."
The law also provides that if any vacancy shall occur in the district registrars or election inspectors, such vacancy shall be filled
from the same political party to which the absentee belongs. Sect.
1, art. 7, of our Constitution, prescribes the qualifications of electors. It contains no provision for a registration law; and such a
law can only be sustained and upheld under sect. 1, art. 7, of that
instrument, which authorizes the legislature to pass laws "to preserve the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the elective
franchise." The legislature is utterly powerless to pass any act to
hinder or abridge, in the exercise of the electoral right, any person
who is an elector under the constitution, except the manifest intent
and operation of the law be to protect the legal voters from fraud
and abuse of the elective franchise. If a registration law, therefore,
is constitutional, it must be so drawn as by its terms to proscribe
no man because of his political belief; and the officers whose duty
it is to operate the machinery of registration and election, who sit
in judgment upon the right of citizens to vote, cannot by law be
restricted to any or two political parties.
We must take judicial knowledge of the current undisputed
history of our state and country, and act upon the assumption and
the fact that there are to-day, at least,.in the state of Michigan
and in the city of Detroit, four political parties, to wit: Republican, Democratic, National or Greenback, and Union or Prohibition. To confine the registration and election boards to men composed wholly of any one, two or three of these parties, would be a
plain violation of the spirit of our constitution, and have a tendency
to hamper and abridge the elective rights of those belonging to the
political party or parties who, by law, would not and could not have
any representation upon such boards. But such a law is also in
direct conflict with the plain letter of the constitution. Sect. 1,
art. 18, of that instrument, after prescribing the form of the official
oath of the members of the legislature, and all officers, executive
and judicial, concludes as follows : "And no other oath, declaration or test, shall be required as a qualification for any office or
public trust,."
In my opinion there can be no doubt but this law subjects the
officers of registration and election in Detroit to a political test. If
the two leading parties in that city be Democratic and Republican,
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thren any citizen who cannot, by reason of bris political conscience,
ally himself with one or the other of these parties, is debarred
by law of the right of holding one of these offices. If the
National and Prohibition parties should be the two leading ones,
then the Republicon or Democrat would be ostracised. There can
be in a true republican. government no political or religious test in
holding office, the political and religious liberty of the citizen being
at the foundation of republican institutions. If this law had provided in express terms that these various boards should be equally
divided between Democrats and Republicans, its repugnance to the
constitution would be plainly apparent to all. As it is, it accomplishes by indirect language the same result.
The opinion of Chief Justice CAM5PBELL in People v. flw'lbut, 24
Mich. 90F-92, correctly applies the principle that no person can be
prevented from holding office because of his political opinions.
Suppose the legislature should enact a law that the school officers
of any city or village in this state should be selected equally from
the members of the two leading churches therein, making a religious test, would- anyone argue for a moment that such an act was
constitutional? And certainly the right of the citizen tQ his political opinions is and should be as zealously guarded as his right to
his religious belief.
It is urged that the political proscription in this law is less than
actually takes place without it ; that those having the appointing
power of registrars and inspectors under the old law do, in Detroit,
as a matter of fact, appoint all these officers from one party instead
of two, thus precluding still more citizens from these places. In
answer it can be said that this is an abuse of power not sanctioned
by the law, but permitted, if at all, by its silence, while this act
before us puts the seal and stamp of approval upon the very abuse
it seeks to cure, and makes it a requisite for these officers to be partisans of a certain name or designation ; thus making this evil of
partisan appointment a permanent feature of our state polity. For
if the legislature has power to require that these offices shall be
filled by members of two parties only, it is competent to pass a law
that they shall be holden only by the member.s of the leading party;
andl a partisan majority in the legislature might fix the political
belief of every municipal officer in the state. taking from the people
of the lut:lity the right to have a government of a different political
color than the legislature. The remedy is .%orse than the disease.
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It is not only political oppression, but a deprivation of a local selfgovernment.
Suppose that in one or more election districts in the city of Detroit, the Nationals and Prohibitionists combined were numerically
stronger than the united Republicans and Democrats, though a
minority in the whole city. Then, in these days of party coalition,
it might be possible for the Democrats and Republicans, controlling
the boards of registration and election in the city, and in these
wards and districts, to combine against the other two parties in such
districts. In such a case there would be naturally the same incentive to and opportunity for frauds and abuses as if all the registrars
and inspectors belonged to one party; and it is therefore doubtful
if the present law would in all cases have the effect desired.
Suppose, further, the two leading parties in Detroit to be, as they
actually are Democratic and Republican. The plurality of these
dominant parties over the third party might be so small and trifling
in the entire city that in two-thirds or even three-quarters of the
wards in the city the -third party might have a plurality of votes
over either, and yet have no representation except one inspector
upon any of these boards, and therefore liable to the same evils that
we now deplore.
Again, the inspectors must be of the same political shade as the
two leading parties in the common council; and it would not be an
unusual thing to have the leading parties in the city not the same
as the leading parties in the common council.
The argument might be elaborated further, but it is useless. In
any way we turn- this law, and apply it to the common every-day
occurrences in political life and action at our elections, the more
clearly does it appear that this act can have no other effect than a
disfranchisement of a large body of the people from holding these
offices, simply, because they are politically for the time being in the
minority in the whole city. And it should be remembered that all
are liable to bear its ostracism. The changes and fluctuations in
votes constantly going on, often places the majority at the last election in the minority at the next, and they who wield the club of
power under this law to-day may feel themselves its weight tomorrow.
I fully agree in the views so ably expressed by Justice CAMPBELL in the leading opinion filed in this case. The nearer the
officers are to the people over whom they have control the more
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easily and readily are reached the evils that result from political
corruption. and the more speedy and. certain the cure. The form.
of our state gov'ernment pro-supposes that the people of each locality,
each municipal district or political unit, are intelligent and virtuousenough to be fully capable of self-government, and the idea that the
further removed the election officers are from the people, the less we
encourage fraud and the more nearly we attain virtue at the ballotbox, is not in harmony with the theory and spirit of our institutions.
It matters not what legislation has heretofore been adopted in the
same road with this law; it is our duty to deal with the encroachment brought before us and to remove it.
The writ of mandamus must be denied.
The principal case is one of general
importance.
We have been able to
find only two other cases- directly bearing
upon the point involved-, viz., the case
of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 464, and
the case of Thie People v. Iludlbut, 24
Mich. 44, referred to in the principal
case. The principle involved, however,
seems very clear. The general doctrine
is thus stated by Judge Coormr, in his
work on Constitutional Limitations:
"A statute would not be constitutional
which should proscribe a class or party
for opinion's sake, or which should select
particular individuals from a class or
locality, and subject them to peculiar
rules, or impose upon them special obligations or burdens from which others in
the same locality are exempt."
In illustration of the first clause of the above
quotation, the case of BRatmnorev. State,
supra, is cited. That case is an interesting one. The Constitution of Maryland,
then in force, contained the following
provision - "That no other test or qualification ought to be required on adinission to any office
of truqt or profit,
than such oath of officeas may be
prc-erihed by the constitution, or by the
laws of' the state, anl a declaration of
helief in the ('hri-an religion ; and if
the party shall profess to he a Jew, the
declaration shall be of hii belief in a

future state of rewards and punishments." Declaration of Rights, art. 34.
By the 6th section of the Metropolitan
Police Law of Baltimore (1859), it was
provided, that "no Black Republican,

or indorser or supporter of the Belper
Book shall be- appointed to any office"
under the Police Board by it established.
The objection. to this cluse as being
unconstitutional-was thus summarily disposed of by the court: "That portion of
the sixth section which relates to Black
Republicans, &c., is obnoxious to the
objection urged against it, if we are to
consider that class of persons as proscribed on account of their political or
religious opinions."
The court then
very disingenuously evaded the question
by sa-ing: "But we cannot understand
officially who are meant to be affeted
by the proviso, and therefore cannot express a judicial opinion on the question ;"
aconclusion which Judge COOLEr very
justly criticises as follows :
"'This does not seem to be a very satisfactory disposition of so grave a constitutioual objection to a legislative act.
That courts may take judicial notice of
the fht that the electors of the country
are divided into parties with well-known
designations, cannot ie doubted ; and
wheu one of these i.; ,ro-criled hy a name
finiliarly apllici to it by its o01)',1icilt-.
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the inference that it is done because of
political opinion seems too conclusive to
need further support than that which is
found in the act itself. And we know
no reason why courts ihould decline
to take notice of those facts of general
notoriety, which, like the names of political parties, are a-part of the public
history of the times."
The case of The People v. Hurlbut, has
a more direct bearing upon the point in
question. Among several other important constitutional questions, the question
involved in the principal case came up
for consideration, and was discussed by
the several members of the court; the
case, however, was decided upon other
grounds.
CHRISTIANCY, J., while seeming to
favor the constitutionality of the clause
in question, thought the decision of it unnecessary in that case. CAMPBELL, C.
J., expressed a clear and forcible opinion against its constitutionality.
CooLEY, J., with reference to this
point, among other things, said (page
94) : "Nor can the whole act be void
because of the provision that the appointees under it shall be members of two
certain political parties. That provision,
so far as it was designed to control appointments for the future, is simply nugatory, because the legislature on general
principles have no power to make party
affiliations a- qualification for office. But
so far as the provision can be regarded
as a declaration that the appointees
named have been selected because they
sustained the specified party relations,
wa need only say that when- a right-

of choice exists, an election cannot be
held void because of the reasons assigned
for the choice made. * * * All that the
law can do is to allow freedom of selee
tion by proscribing nobody, and to confer
the power of choice upon the persons
or body most likely to be governed by
correct motives ; and the choice thus made
must be conclusively presumed to have
been made upon the proper grounds."
From what has been above quoted, it
will be seen that upon the question as to
the right of the legislature to prescribe the
political tests in question, the majority of
the court who rendered opinions in the
case were in harmony, the divergence of
opinion taking place upon the question as
to the effect of this clause upon the rest
of the act.
As to the main question in the principal case, viz., whether the proposed
test is unconstitutional or not, we do not
see how there can well be any difference
of opinion. The decision upon this question seems clearly correct ; and to us it
seems equally clear that this party representation .is the essential purpose of the
act, and that the whole acnmust stand or
fall with the clause. This, however, involves another question which we do not
propose discussing at this time. The
principles governing-the question are clear
and well settled, and we shall content
ourselves by a simple reference to Judge
Coormy's great work on Constitutional
Limitations, where the subject will be
found fully discussedMARSHALL D. EWBLL.
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Under a contract to deliver 5000 tons of ironr rails at'a specified price per ton,
to be shipped at the rate of about 1000-tons per month, settlement cas-t on presentation of bills, the seller's failure to ship the required quantity in the first month
gives-the buyerthe right to resciudthe whole contract.
Such a contract is an entire contract, and the subsidiary provisions-as to shipping
in different months, and as to paying for each shipment on delivcry- do not so split
up the contract that a seller in-default as to one-delix-ery can- insist upon the accept-I
ance of the subsequent deliveries.
The English cases reviewed and the wefght of authority held-to be in favor of the
rule laid down in Hoare y. Rennie, 5 R-. & N. 19.

-Nerror to the Circuit Court of the United States for the -Eastern- District of Pennsylvania.
This was. an action of assumpsit brought by Arthur Norrington,
a citizen of Great Britain, trading under the name of A. Norringon & Go., against James A. Wright and others, citizens of Pennsylvania, trading under the name of Peter Wright & Sons, upon
the following contract-:
"Philadelphia, Janiary 19th 1880. Sold to Messrs. Peter Wright
& Sons, for account of 'A.Norrington & Co., London, five thousand
(5000) tons old T iron rails, for shipment from a European port or
ports, at the rate of about one thousand (1000)tons per month, beginning February 1880, -but whole contract to be shipped before
August 1st 1880, at forty-five dollars ($46.00) per ton, of 2240
lbs. custom hQuse weight, ex ship Philadelphia. Settlement cash
on presentation of bills accompanied by custom-house certificate of
weight. Sellers to notify buyers of shipments, with vessel's names,
as soon as known by them. Sellers not to be compelled to replace
any parcel lost after* shipment. Sellers, when possible, to secure
to buyers right to name discharging berth of vessels at Philadelphia.EDWARD J. ETTING,
Metal Broker."
The declaration contained 'three counts. The first count alleged
the contract to have been.for the sale of about 5000 tons of T iron
rails, to be shipped at the i:ate of about 1000 tons a month, beginI See the note to the opinion of the court below in this cac, 21 Am.L. Reg.
(N. S.) 29s ; anl see also the recent case of Blackburn v. Rilly, Court of Errors
and Appeal, of New Jersey, hifra 59.
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ning in February, and ending in July 1880. The second count
set forth the contract verbatim. Each of these two counts alleged
that the plaintiffs, in Februaryi March, April, May, June and July,
shipped the goods at the rate of about 1000 tons a month, and
notified the shipments to the defendants ; and further alleged the
due arrival of the goods at Philadelphia, the plaintiff's readiness to
deliver the goods and bills thereof, with custom-house certificates
of weight, according to the contract, and the defendant's-refusal to
aocept them. The third count differed from the second only in
averring that 400 tons were shipped by the plaintiff in February
and accepted by the defendants, and that the rest was shipped by
the plaintiff at the rate of about 1000 tons a month in March, April,
May, June and July. The defendants pleaded non assumpsit. The
material facts proved at the trial were as follows:
The plaintiff shipped from various -European ports 400 tons by
one vessel in the latter part of February, 885 tons by two vessels
in March, 1571 tons by five vessels in April, 850 tons by three
vessels in May, 1000 tons by two vessels- in June, and 30 tons by
one vessel in July, and notified to the defendants each shipment.
The defendants received and paid for the February shipment
upon its arrival in March, and in April gave directions at what
wharves the March shipments should be discharged on their arrival;
but on May 14th, about the time of the arrival of the March shipments,.and having been then for the first time informed of the
amounts shipped in February, March and April, gave Etting written notice that they should decline to accept the shipments made in
March and April, because none of thenm were in accordance with thecontract; and irr answer to a letter from him of May 16th, wrote
him on May 17th as follows : "We are advised. that what has occurred does not amount to an accepance of the iron under the
circumstances and the terms-of' the contract. You. had a right to
deliver in parcels, and we had a right to expect the stipulated quantity would be delivered until the time was up in which that was
possible. Both delivering and receiving were thus far conditional
on there being thereafter a complete delivery in due time and of the
stipulated article. On the assumption that this time had arrived,
and that you had ascertained that you did not intend to, or could
not, make any further deliveries for the February and March shipments, we gave you the notice that we declined accepting those
deliveries. As to April, it is too plain, we suppose, to require any
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remark. If we are mistaken as to our obligation for the February
and March shipments, of course we must abide the consequences ;
but if we are right, you have not performed your contract, as you
certainly have not for the April shipments. There is then the very
serious and much debated question, as we are advised, whether the
failure to make the stipulated shipments in February or 1%arch has
absolved us from the contract. If it does, we of course will avail
ourselves of this advantage."
On May t8th, Btting wrote to, the defendants, insistingon their
liability for both past and future shipments, and saying, among
other things: "In respect to the objection that there had not been
a complete delivery in due time of the stipulated article, I beg to
call your attention to the fact that while the contraet is for 5000
tons, it expressly stipulates that deliveries may be made during six
months, and that they are only to be at the rate of about 1000 tons
per month." "As to April, while it seems to: me too plain to
require any remark, I do not see how it can seem so to you, unlessyou intend to accept the rails. If you object to taking all three
shipments made in that month, I shall feel authorized to deliver only
two, of the cargoes, or -forthat matter, to make the. delivery of precisely 1000 tons. But I think I am entitled to know definitely
from you. whether you intend to reject the April shipments, and if
so, upon what ground, and also whether you are decided to reject
the remaining shipments under the contract. You say in your last
paragraph that you shall avail yourselves of the advantage, if you
are absolved from the contract, but as you seem to be in doubt whether you can set up that claim or not, I should like to know definitely what is your intention."
On May 19th, the defendants replied: "We do not read the contract as you do. We read it as stipulating for monthly shipments
of about 1000 tons, beginning in February, and that the six months'
clause is to secure the completion of whatever had fallen short in
the five months. As to the meaning of -about,' it is settled as well
as such a thing can be, and certainly neither the February, March,
or April shipments are within the limits." "As to the proposal to
Vary the notices for April 'shipments, we do not think you can do
this. The iotice of the shipments, as soon as known, you were
bound to give, and cannot afterward vary it if they do not conform
to the contract. Our right to be notified immediately that the shipments were known is as material a provision as any other, nor can
VOL. XXXIV.-7
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it be changed now in order to make that a performance which was
no performance within the time required." "You ask us to determine whether we will or will not object to receive further shipments
because of past defaults. We tell you we will if we are eiktitled to
do so. We do not think you have the right to compel us to decide
a disputed question of law to relieve you from the risk of deciding
it yourself. You know quite as well as we do what is the rule and
its uncertainty of application."
On June 10th, Etting offered to the defendants the alternative
of delivering to them 1000 tons, strict measure, on account of the
shipments in April. This offer they immediately declined.
On June 15th, Etting wrote to the defendants that two cargoes,
amounting to 221 tons, of the April shipments, and two cargoes,
amounting to 650 tons, of the May shipments (designated by the
names of the vessels), had been erroneously notified to them, and
that about 900 tons had been shipped by a certain other vessel on
account of the May shipments. On the same day the defendants
replied that the notification as to April shipments could not be corrected at this late date, and after the terms of the contract had
long since been broken.
From the date of the contract to the time of its rescission by the
defendant, the market price of such iron was lower than that stipulated in the contract, and was constantly falling. After the arrival
of the cargoes, and their tender and refusar, they were sold by
Etting, with the consent of the defendants, for the benefit of whom
it might concern.
At the trial the plaintiff contended-i. That under the contract
he had six months in which to ship 5000 tons, and any deficiency
in the earlier months could be made up subsequently, provided that
the defendants could not be required to take more than 1000 tons
in any one month. 2. That, if this was not so, the contract was a
divisible contract, and the remedy of the defendants for a default in
any month wfis not rescission of the whole contract, but only by
deduction of the damages caused by the delays in thd shipmetits on
the part of the plaintiff.
But the court instructed the jury that if the defendants, at the
time of accepting the delivery of the cargo paid for, had'no notice
of the failure of the plaintiff to ship about 1000 tons in the month of
February, and immediately upon learning that fact gave notice
of their intention to rescind, the verdict should be for them.
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The plaintiff excepted to this ins.trtction, and, after verdict and
judgment for the defendants, su.- out
writ of errer.
%vi
Samuel Dickson and John, a Bui.'z fcr plaintiff in error.
R. C. ]ieJlfart-rie,for defendants in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GRAY, J. (after stating the facts as above).-In the contracts of
merchants, time is of the essence. The time of shipment is the
usual and convenient means of fixing the probable time of arrival,
with a view of providing funds to pay for the goods, or of fulfilling
contracts with third persons. A statement descriptive of the subjectmatter, or of some material incident, such as the time or place of
shipment, is ordinarily to be regarded, as a warranty, in the sense
in which that term- is used in insurance and maritime law; that is
to say, a condition precedent upon the failure or non-performance
of which the party aggrieved may repudiate the whole contract:
Belin v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751 ; Bowe&v. Shand, 2 App. Cas.
455; Lowber v. Bangs, 2 Wall. 728 ; Davison v. Von Tingen, 113
U.S.40.
The contract sued on is a single contract for the sale and purchase of 5000 tons of iron rails, shipped from a European port or
ports for Philadelphia. The subsidiary provisions as to shipping
in different months, and as to paying for each shipment upon its
delivery, do not split up the contract into as many contracts as
there shall be shipments or deliveries of so many distinct quantities
of iron: Mfersey Co. v. NDaylor, 9 App. Cas. 434, 439. The further provision, that the sellers shall not be compelled to replace any
parcel lost after shipment, simply reduces, in the event of such loss,
the quantity to be delivered and paid for.
The times of shipment, as designated in the contract, are "at the
rate of about 1000 tons per month, beginning February 1880, but
whole contract to be shipped before August 1st, 1880. These words
are not satisfied by shipping one-sixth part of the 5000 tons, or
about 833 tons, in each of'the six months which begin with February and end with July. But they require about 1000 tons to be
shipped in each of the five months from February to June inclusive, and allow no more than slight and unimportant deficiencies in
the shipments during those months to be made up in July. The
contract is not one for the sale of a lot of goods, identified by inde-
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pendent circumstances, such s all those deposited in a certain warehouse, (,r to be shipiped in 'a paiticuar vessel; or that may be
manufactured by the seller, or may be required for use by the
buyer. in a -ertain mifl -- ;n -which case the mention of the quantity,
accoinpanied by thc qualification of" about," or ", more or less," is
regarded as a mere estimate of the probable amount, as to which
good faith is all that is required of the party making it. The contract before us comes within the general rule: "When no such
independent circumstances are referred to, and the engagement is
to furnish goods of a certain quality or character to a certain
amount, the quantity specified is material, and governs the contract. The addition of the qualifying words 'about,' ' more or less,'
and the like, in such cases, is only for the purpose of providing
against accidental variations, arising from slight and unimportant
excesses or deficiencies in number, measure or weight:" _rooklyn
v. United States, 96 U. S. 168, 171, 172.
The seller is bound to deliver the quantity stipulated, and has no
right either to compel the buyer to accept a less quantity or to
require him to select part out of a greater quantity; and when the
goods are to be shipped in certain proportions monthly, the seller's
failure to ship the required quantity in the first month, gives the
buyer the same right to rescind the whole contract, that he would
have had if it had been agreed that all the goods should be delivered at once.
The plaintiff, instead of shipping about 1000 tons in February
and about 1000 tons in March, as stipulated in the contract, shipped
only 400 tons in February, and 885 tons in March. His failure
to fulfil the contract on his part in respect to these first two instalments, justified the defendants in rescinding the whole contract,*
provided they distinctly and seasonably asserted the right of rescission.
The defendants, immediately after the arrival of the March
shipments, and as soon as they knew that the quantities which had
been shipped in February and in March were less than the contract called for, clearly and positively asserted the right to rescind,
if the law entitled them to do so. Their previous acceptance of
the single cargo of 400 tons shipped in February was no waiver
of this right, because it took place without notice, or mean5 of
knowledge, that the stipulated quantity had not been shipped in
February. The price paid by them for that cargo being above the
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market value, the plaintiff suffered no injury by the omission of
the defendants to return the iron ; and no reliance -was placed- on
that omission in the correspondence between the parties.
The case wholly differs from that of Lyon v. Bertram, 20 How149, in which the buyer of a specific lot-of goods accepted anI used
part of them with full means of previously ascertaining whether
they conformed to the contract.
The plaintiff, denying the defendants' right to rescind, and
asserting that the contract was still in force, was bound to show
such performance on his part as entitled him to demand performance on their part, and, having failed to do so, cannot maintain
this action.
For these reasons we are of opinion that the judgment below
should be affirmed. But as much of the argument at the bar was
devoted, to a discussion of the recent English cases, and as a diversity in the-law, as administered on the two sides of the Atlantic,
concerning the interpretation and effect of commercial contracts of
this kind, is greatly to be deprecated, it is proper to add, that upon
a careful examination of the cases referred to they do not appear to
us to establish any rule inconsistent with our conclusion.
In the reading case -of H~oare v. Rennie, 5 H. & N. 19, which
-was an action upon a contract of sale of 667 tons of bar iron, to be
shipped from Sweden in June, July, August and September, and
in about equal portions each month, at a certain price payable on
delivery, the declaration alleged that the plaintiffs performed all
things necessary to entitle them to have the contract performed by
the defendants, and were ready and willing to perform the contract
on their part, and in June shipped a certain portion of the iron,
and within a reasonable time afterwards offered to deliver to the
defendants the portion so shipped, but the defendants refused to
receive it, and gave notice to the plaintiffs, that they would not
accept the rest. The defendants pleaded that the shipment in June
was of about twenty tons only, and that the plaintiffs failed to complete the shipment for that month according to the contract. Upon
demurrer to the pleas, it was argued for the plaintiffs that the shipment of about one-fourth of the iron in each month was not a
condition precedent, and that the defendants" only remedy for a
failure to ship that quantity Was by a cross action. But judgment
was given for the defendants, Chief Baron POLLOcK saying:
"The defendants refused to accept the first shipment, because, as
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they say, it was not a performance, but a breach of the contract.
Where parties have made an- agreement for themselves, the courts
ought not to make another for them. Here they say that in the
events that have happened, one-fourth shall be shipped in each
month, and we cannot say that they meant to accept any other
quantity. At the outset the plaintiffs failed to tender the quantity
according to the contract; they tendered a much less quantity. The
defendants had a right to say that this was no performance of the
contract, and they were no more bound to accept the short quantity
than if a single delivery had been contracted for. Therefore the
pleas are an answer to the action:" 5 H. & N. 28. So in Uoddington v. Paleologo, L. R., 2 Ex. 193, while there was a division
of opinion upon the question whether a contract to supply goods
"delivering on April 17th, complete 8th May," bound the seller
to begin delivering on April 17, all the judges agreed that if it
did, and the seller made no delivery on that day, the buyer
might rescind the contract.
On the other hand in Simpson v. (Jrippin, L. R., 8 Q. B. 14,
under a contrabt to supply from 6000 to 8000 tons of coal, to be taken
by the buyers' wagons from the seller's colliery in equal monthly
quantities for twelve months, the buyer sent wagons for only 150
tons during the first month, and it was held that this did not entitle
the seller to annul the contract and decline to deliver any more
coal, but that his only remedy was by an action for damages. And
in Brandt v. Lawrence, 1 Q. B. Div. 344, in which the "ontract
was for the purchase of 4500 quarters, ten per cent. more or
less, of Russian oats, "shipment by steamer or steamers during
February," or, in case of ice preventing shipment, then immediately upon the opening of navigation, and 1139 quarters were
shipped by one steamer in time, and 3361 quarters were shipped
too late, it was held that the buyer was bound to accept the 1139
quarters, and was liable to an action by the seller for refusing to
accept them.
Such being the condition of the law of England as declared in.
the lower courts, the case of IBowes v. Shand, alfter conflicting
decisions in the Queen's Bench Division and the Court of
Appeal, was finally determined by the House of Lords: 1 Q.
B. D. 470; 2 Id. 112; 2 App. Cas. 455.
In that case, two contracts were made in London, each for the
sale of 300 tons of" IMadras rice, to be shipped at Madras or coast,
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for this port, during the months of March and (or) April, 1874, per
Rajah of Cochin." The 600 tons filled 8200 bags, of which 7120
bags were put on board and bills of lading signed in February ; and
for the rest, consisting of 1030 bags put on board- in February, and
50 in March, the bill of lading was signed in March. At the trial
of an action by the seller against the buyer for refusing to accept
the cargo, evidence was given that rice shipped in February would
be the spring crop, and quite as good as the rice shipped in March
or April. Yet the House of Lords held that the action, could not
be maintained, because the meaning of the contract, as apparent
upon its face, was that all the rice must be put on board in March
and April, or in one of those months.
In the opinions there delivered the general principles underlying
this class of cases are most clearly and satisfactorily stated. It will
be sufficient to quote a few passages from two of those opinions.
Lord Chancellor CAIRNs said: "It does not appear to me to be
a question for your lordships, or for any court, to consider whether
that is a contract which bears upon the face of it some reason, some
explanation why it was made in that form, and why the stipulation
is made that the shipment should-be during these particular months.
It is a mercantile cntract, and merchants are not in the habit of
placing upon their contracts stipulations to which they do not
attach some value and importance:" 2 App. Cas. 463. "If it be
admitted that the literal meaning would imply that the whole quantity must be put on board during-a specified time, it is no answer
to that literal meaning, it is no observation which can dispose of, or
get aid of, or displace that literal meaning, to say that it puts an
additional burden on the seller, without a corresponding benefit to
the purchaser; that is a matter of which the seller and the purchaser are the best judges. Nor is it any reason for saying that it
would be a means by which purchasers, without any real cause,
would frequently obtain an excuse for rejecting contracts when
prices had dropped. The non-fulfilment of any term in any contract is a means by which a purchaser is able to get rid of the
contract when prices have dropped; but that is no reason why a
term which is found in a contract should not be fulfilled :" pp.
465, 466. "It was suggested that even if the construction of the
contract be as I have statdd, still if the rice was not put on board in
the particular months, that would not be a reason which would
justify the appellants in having rejected the rice altogether, but
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that it mighfafford a ground for a cross-action by them if they
could show that any particular damage resulted to them from the
rice not having been put on board in the months in question. My
lords, I cannot think that there is any foundation whatever for that
argument. If the construction of the contract be as I have said
that it bears, that the rice is to be put on hoard in the months in
question, that is part of the description of the subject-matter of
what is sold. What is sold is not 300 tons of rice in gross or in
general. It is 300 tons of Madras rice, to be put on board at
Madras during the particular months.." "The plaintiff, who sues
upon that contract has not launched his case until he has* shown
that he has tendered that thing which has been contracted for, and
if he is unable to show that, he cannot claim any damages for the
nonfulfilment of the contract:" 467, 468.
Lord BLACKBURN said: "If the description of the article tendered is different in any respect, it is n6t the article bargained for,
and the other party is not bound to take it. I think in this case
what the parties bargained for was rice, shipped at Madras or the
coast of Madras. Equally good rice might have been shipped a
little to the north or a little to the south of the coast of Madras.
I do not quite know what the boundary is, and probably equally
good rice might have been shipped in February as was shipped in
March, or equally good rice might have been shipped in May as
was shipped in April, and I dare say equally good rice might have
been put on board another ship as that which was put on board the
Rajah of Cochin. But the parties have chosen, for reasons best
known to themselves, to say: We bargain to take rice, shipped in
this particular region, at that particular time, on board that particular ship, and before the defendants can be compelled to take
anything in fulfilment of that contract, it must be shown not
merely that it is equally good, but that it is the same article as
they have bargained for-otherwise they are not bound to take it:'
2 App. Cas. 480, 481.
Soon after that decision of the House of Lords two cases were
determined in the Court of Appeal. In _Reuter v. Sald, 4 0.P.D.
239, under a contract for the sale of "about twenty-five tons (more
or less) black pepper, October and (or) November shipment, from
Penang to London, the name of the vessel or vessels, marks and
full particulars to be declared to the buyer in writing within sixty
days from date of bill of lading," the seller, within the sixty days
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declared twenty-five tons by a particular vessel, of which only twenty
tons were shipped in November, and five tons in December; and it
was held that the buyer had the right to refuse to receive any part
of the pepper. In ffoucek v. Muller, 7 Q. R. R. 92, under a contract for the sale of 2000 tons of pig iron, to be delivered to the
buyer free on board, at the maker's wharf" in November, or equally
over November, December and January next," the buyer failed to
take any in November, but demanded delivery of one-third in December, and one-third in January; and it was held that the seller
was justified in refusing to deliver, and in giving notice to, the
buyer that he considered the contract as cancelled by the buyernot
taking any iron in November.
The plaintiff in the case at bar greatly relied on the very recent
decision of the-House of Lords in Mersey Co. v. Naytor, 9 App.
Cas. 434, affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal in 9 Q.
B. D. 648, and following the decision of the Court of Common
Pleas in _reetk v. Burr, L. R., 9 C. P. 208.
But the point there decided was that the failure of the buyer to
pay for the first instalment of the goods upon delivery, does not,
unless the circumstances evince an intention on his-part to be no
longer bound by the contract, entitle the seller to. rescind the- contract and to decline to make any further deliveries under it. And
the grounds of the decision, as stated by Lord Chancellor SELBORNE,
in moving judgment in the House of Lords, are applicable only to
the case of a failure of the buyer to pay for, and not to that of a
failure of the seller to deliver, the first instalment.
The Lord Chancellor said: " The contract is for the purchase of
5000 tons of steel blooms of the company's manufacture; therefore
it is one contract for the purchase of that quantity of steel blooms.
No doubt there are subsidiary terms in the contract as to the time
of delivery. 'Delivery 1000 tons monthly commencing January
next -' and as to the time of payment, ' Payment net cash within
three days after receipt of shipping documents ;' but that does not
split up the contract into as many contracts as there shall be deliveries for the purpose, of so many distinct quantities of iron. It is
quite consistent with the natural meaning of the contract, that it is
to be one contract for the purchase of that quantity of iron to be
delivered at those times and.in that manner, and for which payment
is so to be made. It is perfectly clear that no particular payment
can be a condition precedent of the entire contract, because the
VOL. XXI V.--8
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delivery under the contract was most certainly to precede payment;
and that being so, I do not see how, without express words, it can
possibly be made a condition precedent to the subsequent fulfilmenof the unfulfilled part of the contract, by the delivery of the unde
livered steel :" 9 App. Cas. 439.
Moreover, although in the Court of Appeal dicta were uttered
tending to approve the decision in Simpson v. CWrppin, and to disparage the decisions in Hoare v.Rennie and .Houck v. Muller,
above cited, yet in the House of Lords Simpson v. Orppin-was not
even referred to, and Lord BLACKBURN, who had given the leading
opinion in that case, as well as Lord BRAMWELL, who had delivered
the leading opinion in Houck v. Muller, distinguished .Hoarev.
Rennie and ifoucek v. Muller from the case in judgment: 9 App.
Cas. 444, 446.
Upon a review of the English decisions, the rule laid down in the
earlier cases of Hoare v. Bennie, and 'Cddington v. Paleologo, as
well as in the later cases of Reuter v. Sala, and Houcek v. Muller,
appears to us to be supported by a greater weight of authority than
the rule stated in the intermediate cases of Simpson v. Crippin and
Brandt v. Lawrence, and to accord better with the general principles affirmed by the House of Lords in Bowes v. Shand, while it
in nowise contravenes the decision of that tribunal in Mersey Co.
v. Naylor.
In this country, there is less judicial authority upon the question. The two cases most nearly in point, that have come to our
notice, are ttill v. Blake, 97 N. Y. 216, which accords with Bowes
v. Shand, and King Philip Mills v. Slater, 12 R. I. 82, which
approves and follows Hoare v. Rennie. The recent cases in the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, cited at the bar, support no other
conclusion. In Shinn v. Bodine, 60 Penn. St. 182, the point decided was that a contract for the purchase of 800 tons of coal at a
certain price per ton, " coal to be delivered on board vessels as
sent for during months of August and September," was an entire
contract, under which nothing was payable until delivery of the
whole, and therefore the seller bad no right to rescind the contract
-upon a refusal to pay for one cargo before that time. In Morgan
v. McKee, 77 Penn. St. 228, and in Scott v. Kittanning Coal Co.,
89 Id. 231, the buyer's right to rescind the whole contract upon
the failure of the seller to deliver one instalment, was denied, only
because that right had been waived, in the one case by unreason-
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able delay in asserting it, and in the other by having accepted, paid
for and used a previous instalment of the goods. The decision of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Winchester v.
2ewton, 2 Allen 492, resembles that of the House of Lords in
Hersey Co. v. Naylor.
Being of opinion that the plaintiff's failure to make such shipments in February and March as the contract required prevents his
maintaining this action, it is needless to dwell upon the further
objection that the shipments in April did not comply with the contract, because the defendants- could not be compelled to take about
1000 tons out of-the larger quantity shipped in that month,_ and the
plaintiff, after once designating the names- of vessels, as- the contract
bound hira to-do, could not substitute other vessels. See Busk v.
Spenee, 4 Camp 329 ; Grave&v. Legg, 9 BExcb 709; Reuter Y.
Sala, above cited.
Judgment affirmed.
The Chief- Justice was not present at the argument and took nopart in the decision of this case.

Court of Errors and Appeals of 'ew Jersey.
BLACKBURN v. REILLY.'
Upon a contract of sale-to be performed not by single acts of delivery and payment, but by a series of deliveries-and payments at stated intervals, defaults by one
party in making particular deliveries or payments wvilL not release the other party
unless the conduct of thi party in default be such as to evince an intention to abandon-the contract, or a design no longer to be bound by its terms.
Plaintiff agreed to deliver to defendant 52 car-loads of bark, at $18 a ton, to be
delivered at the rate of one car-load per week. Plaintiff delivered five car-loads.
]Defendant paid for these, but subsequently discovered the bark to be defective- in
quality, and refused to receive any more. He!J, that the defective quality of the
bark delivered did not release defendant from his obligation to accept and pay for the
remaining car-loads.
11fersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor, 9 App. Cas. 434, followed.

I- case. In error to the Essex Circuit Court.
Blackburn. the plaintiff below, a Virginia dealer in bark, entered
into a contract on May 13th 1882, to sell to the defendant below,
Reilly, a Newark tanner, for use in his business, 52 car-loads of
I See Norrington v. WVright, supra, page 47.
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bark, at the price of $18 a ton, to be delivered at the rate of one
.tar load per week until th e wlole should have been delivered.
Under this contract five car-loads were actually delivered. This
was stored by Reilly in a loft over his tannery with other bark. It
was all paid for at the contract price by July 3d, 1882, but none of
it was used until July 15th. Reilly claims that it was then found
to be musty, lumpy, and unfit for the purpose fdr which it had been
bought; and shortly after Reilly notified Blackburn not to send
any more-first by mail, alleging that he was overcrowded, and
shortly afterwards in a personal interview, alleging its unmerchantable condition.
In January, 1883, and before the expiration of the year within
which the bark was to have been delivered, Blackburn brought suit,
setting forth the above contract and the breach of it. The defedant pleaded the general issue. Before trial, however, the parties
came to an understanding, and made an agreement in writing, dated
March 27th, 1883, which was delivered on April 4th, 1883. By
its terms it was stipulated that the contract for the breach of which
suit had been brought should be completed by the delivery by
Blackburn of a sufficient number of car loads of bark to make, with
what had already been delivered, 52 car loads, at the price of $17
per ton, payable on delivery of each car load. This new agreement
then went on to provide as follows: "(4) One car load only shall
be delivered during each week after shipments shall begin, and said
shipments shall begin on the first day of April next, or within ten
days thereafter." "(6) This suit shall not be discontinued or zon
prossed until the final completion of this contract. The plaintiff
shall then discontinue it without costs. But in case of a breach of
this contract by said Reilly, the plaintiff may proceed in this suit
by requiring the defendant to plead, and the suit shall proceed
thereon to trial, and the damages to be recovered shall be measured
by the original contract sued on. Said Reilly shall, on the execution hereof, pay the taxed costs of the plaintiff. It is understood
that this suit is not settled unless the terms of this contract are
faithfully carried out by said Reilly."
Blackburn did not deliver any bark within the 10 days stipulated,
or subsequently. Reilly, on his part, tendered the costs on April
21st, and gave notice that he would not receive any bark under the
contract because of the lapse of time. The tender was refused,
and Blackburn insisted on proceeding in the original suit. Reilly
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then pleaded puis darrein continuance, two additional pleas setting
forth the new agreement, Blacaburn's failure to deliver under it,
and Reilly's tender of costs, to which Blackburn demurred, and
judgment was given in favor of the demurrant. The case then
went to trial on the general issue as originally pleaded-; the damages claimed being damages for the breach of the first agreement.
The defence interposed was that the delivery of five loads of unmerchantable bark justified the defendant in refusing to receive any
more bark under the contract. This defence was overruled by the
court, and the plaintiff had judgment. Exceptions being sealed for
the defendant, he brought this writ of error.
Mr. Uoult, for plaintiff.
Mr. Stevens, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DixoN, J.-The first question for decision on this writ of error
is whether the pleas 2puis darTein continuance. were good. They
were pleaded in.bar of the action, and a prime requisite of such
pleas is that they shall allege facts which form a conclusive answer
to. the action, and entitle the defendant to a, final judgment in the
cause. I Chit. Pl. 525. The express terms of the contract relied
on in these pleas show that nothing growing out of and dependent
upon, that agreement could have this broad effect in favor of the defendant. According to its provisions, the defendant was forthwith
to pay the costs of this suit. In case he failed to comply with its
stipulations, the suit was to proceed as if the contract had not been
made; and if he fully performed it, the plaintiff was to discontinue
the suit without costs. So that the effect upon the pending litigation which could result from circumstances the most favorable to
the defendant was that the plaintiff could be compelled to discontinue it without costs. That is quite different from the judgment
for defendant to be rendered upon a good plea in bar which would
award costs to the defendant, and be conclusive in his favor upon
all subsequent litigation involving the same issues. It is evident
that the effect which the parties intended to produce on the pending
suit by force of this agreement could be properly secured only by
motion, not by plea. The demurrer to these pleas was good.
The other question discussed on the argument was whether the
defendant had the right to refuse to receive any more bark in case
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he could satisfy the jury that the-five loads of bark delivered were
not equal in quality to th requirements of the contract. The contract provided that the plaintiff should deliver, and the defendant
should receive, one car-load of bark weekly for a year at 18 a ton,
payable on delivery. It belongs to a class of agreements sometimes
called continuing contracts of sale, because they are to be completely performed, not by single acts of delivery and payment, but
by a series of such acts at stated intervals. The rule to be applied
in determining whether the express obligations of such contracts
remain after one or more breaches by either party has been the subject of much discussion of late years, and has given rise to some
contrariety of judicial opinion. We do not feel constrained by the
phases of the present case to enter at any length upon the details
of this discussion. In our opinion the rule established in England
by the judgment of the House of Lords in Hersey Steel & Iron
Co. v. .Naylor, 9 App. Cas. 434, affirming the judgment of the
Court of Appeals in s. c. 9 Q. B. Div. 648, is one which in ordinary contracts of this nature will work out results most conformable
to reason and justice. The rule is that defaults by one party in
making particular payments or deliveries will not release the other
party from his duty to make the other deliveries or payments stipulated in the contract, unless the conduct of the party in default be
such as to evince an intention to abandon the contract, or a design
no longer to be bound by its terms. This rule leaves the party
complaining of a breach to recover damages for his injury on the
normal principle of compensation, without allowing him the abnormal advantage that might enure to him from an option to rescind
the bargain. It also accords with the ancient doctrine laid down by
Serjeant Williams in his notes to Pordagev. Cole, 1 Saund. 320b,
that where a covenant (of the plaintiff) goes only to part of the
consideration on both sides, and a breach of such covenant may be
paid for in damages, it is an independent covenant, and an action
may be maintained for a breach of the contract on the part of the
defendant without averring performance in the declaratibn. It of
course is inapplicable where the parties have expressed their intention to make performance of a stipulation touching a part of the
bargain a condition precedent to the continuing obligation of the
contract; and peculiar cases might arise where the courts would
infer such an intention from the nature and circumstances of the
bargain itself, cases in which the courts would see that the partial
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stipulation was so important, so went to the root of the matter (to
use a phrase of BLACKBURN, J., in Poussard v. Spiers, 1 Q. B.
Div. 410y, as to make its performance a condition of the obligation
to proceed in the contract.
The case in hand is one of ordinary character, and therefore the
question under the rule is whether the circumstances would warrant
an inference by the jury that the plaintiff purposed to abandon the
contract, or no longer to be bound by its terms. This question is,
we think, not doubtful The plaintiff had delivered five car-loads,
which had been accepted and paid for by the defendant without
any intimation that they were not satisfactory; was ready to deliver
the sixth when the defendant requested delay; and was prevented
from further deliveries only by the peremptory refusal of the defendant to receive any more. Against this refusal the plaintiff
protested, then proposed an arbitration, and threatened suit if the
defendant should persist, and finally brought this action for damages. In the face of all this there is not a shadow of reason for
saying that the plaintiff had abandoned or repudiated the contract.
If the five deliveries of defectivebark had been made against notice
and remonstrance, it might have suggested the idea that the plaintiff meant to disregard his obligations ; but by the defendant's acceptance of and payment for the bark without objection this ground
for a possible inference of repudiation is wanting in the case. We
regard it as incontestable that the deliveries were made in recognition of the binding force of the agreement. The defendant, therefore was not discharged. Ca0en v. Platt, 69 N. Y. 848, was precisely like the case before us. The plaintiff had agreed to sell the
defendant glass, to be delivered in instalments. He had made several deliveries, which had been accepted and paid for by the defendant. Subsequently the defendant complained of the quality, and
refused to receive any more. The suit was for damages resulting
from the refusal, and the plaintiff recovered. Scott v. Kfittanning
Coal Co., 89 Penn. St. 231, was also similar; but there the defendant contended that the conduct of the plaintiff in the delivery of the
defective coal was fraudulent, yet the court held the defendant
would not be thereby dibarged.
There was no error in the ruling of the trial justice on this proffered defence. The judgment below should be affirmed.
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SuPreme Judicial curt of l31assachuetts.
NOROR6SS v. JAIES.
Covenants running with the land may be divided into two classes, viz., those
annexed to the estate, such as the ancient warranty now represented 'by the usual
covenants for title, and those which are attached to the land itself, such as rights of
common or easements.
Covenants of the latter class, in order to be enforceable against the assignees of
the covenantor, must "touch and concern," or "extend to the support of" the
land conveyed.
A covenant in a deed for land containing a quarry that the grantor will not open
or work or allow to be opened or worked, any quarry on a certain farm then owned
by the grantor adjoining the land conveyed, is not such a covenant as may be
enforced against the assigns of the grantor.

Txis was a bill in equity to restrain the defendants from the
breach of a covenant in a deed from one Luke Kibbe, Jr., to William N. Flynt. ' The case was reported to the full bench of the
Supreme Court on an agreed statement of facts, in which it appeared
that one of the inducements of the purchase of the estate was the
valuable quarry of marble it contained, and the covenant the deed
contained restraining the quarrying of marble on the adjoining
land. The plaintiff contended that the covenant was one that ran
with the land, and, as such, was binding on the heirs and assigns
of the covenantor, in favor of the heirs and assigns of the covenantee. The defendant contended that it was personal, and that it
was also void, as being in restraint of trade. The material facts
appear in the opinion.
James G. Dunning, for the plaintiff.
Charles L. Long, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, J.-One Kibbe conveyed to one Flynt a valuable
quarry of six acres, bounded by other land of the grantor, with
covenants as follows : "And I do for myself, my heirs, executorsand administrators, covenant with the said Flynt, his heirs and
assigns, that I am lawfully seised in fee of the afore-granted premises, that they are free of all incumbrances, that I will not open
or work, or allow any person or persons to open or work,
any quarry or quarries on my farm or premises in said Long
Meadow."
By mesne conveyance the plaintiffs have become pos-
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sessed of the quarry conveyed to Flynt, and the defendants of
the surrounding land referred to. in the covenant. The defendants
are quarrying stone in their land like that quarried by the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs bring their bill for an injunction.
The discussion of the question under what circumstances a landowner is entitled to rights created by way of covenant with a former
owner of the- land has been much confused since the time of Lord
CoKE, by neglecting a distinction, which he stated with perfect,
clearness, between those rights which run only with the estate in
the land, and those which are said to be attached to the land itself.
"So note a diversity between a use or warranty, and the like
things annexed to the estate of the land in privity, and commons,
advowsons, and other hereditaments annexed to the possession of the
land: '" Cludldgh's Case, 1 Rep. 122 b. ; s. c. Popham 70, 71.
Rights of the class represented by the ancient warranty, and now
by the usual covenants for title, are pure matters of contract, and
from a very early date down to comparatively modern times lawyers
have been perplexed with the question, How an assignee could sue
upon a contract to- which he was not a paxty (West, Symboleog. I.
sect. 35; Wingate's Maxims4 4 ,pl. 20, 55, pl. 10-; Go. Litt., 117a;
Sir . ,yle Finck's Case, 4 Inst. 85). But an heir could sue upon
a warranty of his ancestor, because for that purpose he was eadem
persona cum antecessore. (See Y. B., 20 & 21 Ed. I., 232 (Rolls
ed.); Oate&v. Frith,Hob. I80 ; Bain v. Cooper, I Dowl. Pr. Cas.
N. S. 11, 14). And the conception was gradually extended in a
qualified way to assigns where they were mentioned in the deed;
Bract. fol. 17 b; 67 a, 380 d; 381; Fleta. III. chap. 14, sect. 6;
1 Britton (Nich.) 255, 256 ; Y. B., 20 Ed. I. 232-234 Roll's ed.);
Fitz. Abr. Covenant, pl. 28; Vin. Abr. V'oucher N, p. 59; Y. B.
14 I. 4, 56; 20 H. 6, 34 b; Old Natura Brevium, Covenant, 67,
B. C. in Rastell's Law Tracts, ecl. 1534 ; Dr. and Student, I., chap.
8; F. N. B. 145 c; Co. Litt., 384 b; Corn. Dig. Covenant, B 3;
Middlemore v. Goodale, Cro. Car. 503; s. c. I& 505 ; W. Jones
406 ; P7pot v. Roare, 2 Atk. 219. But in orderthat an assignee
should be so far identified in law with the original covenantee, he
must have the same estate..that is. the same status or inheritance,
and thus the same persont ,uoad the contract. But as will be seen,
the privity of estate which is thus required, is privity of the estate
with the original covenantee, not with the original covenantor; and
this is the only privity of which there is anything said in the
VOL. XXIV.-9
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ancient books. See further, Y. B.,'21 & 22 Ed. I 148 (Roll's ed.);
14 Hen. IV., pl. 5. Of course we are not now speaking of cases of
landlord and tenant, and it will. be seen that the doctrine has no
necessary connection with tenure. F. N. B. 134 E. We may add
that the burden of an ordinary warranty in fee did not fall upon
assigns, although it might upon an heir as representing the person
of his ancestor. Y. B., 32 & 33 Edw. 1. 516 (Roll's ed).
On the other hand, if the rights in question were of the class to
which commons belonged, and of which easements are the most conspicuous type, these rights, whether created by prescription, grant,
or covenant, when once acquired were attached to the land, and
went with it, irrespective ot privity, into all hands, even those of a
disseisor. "So a disseisor, abator, intruder, or the lord by escheat,
&c., shall have them as things annexed to the land. Ukudteigh's
Case, ubi supra. (See 1 Britton [.Nichols' ed.] 361; Keilway,
145, 146, pl. 15; F. N. B. 180 N. ; Sir H. .Yevil's Case, Plowden
377, 381.) In like manner, when, as was usual, although not
invariable, the duty was regarded as falling upon land, the burden:
of the covenant, or grant, went with the servient land into all
hands, and of course there was no need to mention assigns. See
cases supra et infra. The phrase consecrated to cases where privity
was not necessary was transit terra cum onere. (Bract., fol. 382,
a. b. Fleta, VI., chap. 23, sect. 17. See Y. B., 20 Ed. I. 360
[Roll's ed.]; Keilway 113 pl. 45.) And it was said that "a covenant which runs and rests with the land lies for or against the
assignee at common law, quia transit terra cum onere, although the
assignee be not named in the covenant." (Hyde v. Dean of Windsor, Cro. Eliz. 552 ; Ibid. 457, s. c. 5- Co. Rep. 24 a; Mo6re 309.)
It is not necessary to consider whether possession of the land
alone would have been sufficient to maintain the action of covenant:
It is enough for our present purposes that it carried the right of
property. Neither is it necessary to consider the difficulties that
have sometimes arisen in distinguishing rights of this latter class
from pure matters of contract, by reason of their having embraced
active duties as well as those purely passive and negative ones
which are plainly interests carved out of a servient estate and
matters of grant. The most conspicuous example is Pakenham's
Aase, Y. B., 42 Ed. III., pl. 14, when the plaintiff recovered in
covenant as terre-tenant, although not heir, upon a covenant or
prescriptive duty to sing in the chapel of his manor: Spencer's
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Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 17b. Another which has been recognised
in this Commonwealth is the quasi easement to have fences maintainet: Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175, 185; s. c. 118 Id.
156. Repairs were dealt with on the same footing: they were
likened to estovers and other rights of common: 5 Co. Rep. 24
a. 6; Hyde v. Dean of Windsor, ubi supra. See F. N. B. 127;
Spencer's Case, ubi supra; .Ewre v. Strickland, Cro. Car. 240;
Brett v. Cumberland, 1 Roll. R. 359, 360; and other examples
might be given. See Bract. 382, a. b. ; Fleta, vi., c. 5a, § 17;
Y. B., 20 Ed. I., 360 ; Keilway 2 a, pl. 2; Y. B., 6 Hen. VII., 14
b, pl. 2; Co. Litt. 384 6, 385 a.; Cockson v. Cock, Cro. Jac. 125;
Bush v. Pole, 12 Mod. 24; s. c. 1 Salk. 196; 1 Shower 388;
Carthew 232; Sale v. Kitchenham, 10 Mod. 158. The cases are
generally landlord and tenant cases, but that fact has nothing to do
with the principles laid down.
When it is said, in this class of cases, that there must be a
privity of estate between the covenantor and the covenantee, it
only means that the covenant must impose such a burden on the
land of the covenantor as to- be in substance, or to carry with it, a
grant of an easement or quasi-easement, or must be in aid of such
a grant (Bronson v. Qoffin, ubi supra), which is generally true,
although, as has been shown, not invariably (Pakenhan'sCase, ubi
sup)ra), and although not quite reconcilable with all the old cases
except by somewhat hypothetical historical explanation. But the
expression, privity of estate, in this sense is of modern use, and has
been carried over from the cases of warranty where it was used
with a wholly different meaning.
In the main, the line between the two classes of cases distinguished by Lord COICE is sufficiently clear; and it is enough to say
that the present covenant falls into the second class, if either.
Notwithstanding its place among the covenants for title, it purports to create a pure negative restriction on the use of land, and
we will take it as intended to do so for the benefit of the land
conveyed.
The restriction is in form within the equitable doctrine of notice:
Whitney v. Union Railway Co., 11 Gray 359 ; Parker v. Mightinqale, 6 Allen 341. See Tulk v. J1toxhay, 2 Phillips 774; Haywood v. Rrun-swick Building Society, 8 Q. B. D. 403; London ,.
S. TV. Railwal Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. Div. 562; Ai.'terrry v.
Oldham, 29 Id. 750. But as the deed is recorded, it does
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not matter whether the plaintiff's case is discussed on this footing
or on that of easement.
The question remains, whether, even if we make the further
assumption that the covenant was valid as a contract between the
parties, it is of a kind which the law permits to be attached to land
in such a sense as to restrict the use of one parcel 'in all hands for
the benefit of whoever may hold the other, whatever the principle
invoked. For equity will no more enforce every restriction that can
be devised, than the common law will recognise as creating an easement, every grant purporting to limit the use of land in favor of
other land. The principle of policy applied to affirmative covenants, applies also to negative ones. They must "1touch and concern," or "extend to the support of the thing" conveyed: 5 Co.
Rep. 16 a, Ibid. 24 b. They must be "for the benefit of the
estate :" 0ockson v. Cock, Cro. Jac. 125. Or as it is said more
broadly, new and unusual incidents cannot be attached to land, by
way either of benefit or of burden: Keppell v. Bailey, 2 My. &
K. 517, 535; Ackroyd. v. Smith, 10 C. B. 164; Hill v. Tupver,
2 H. & C. 121.
The covenant under consideration, as it stands on the report, falls
outside the limits of this rule, even in the narrower form. In what
way does it extend to the support of the plaintiff's quarry? It does
not make the use or occupation of it more convenient. It does not
in any way affect the use or occupation ; it simply tends indirectly
to increase its value, by excluding a competitor from the market for
its products. If it be asked, what is the difference in principle between an easement to have land unbuilt upon, such as was recognised
in Brooks v. Reynolds, 108 Mass. 31 ; and an easement to have a
quarry left unopened, the answer is, that whether a difference of
degree or of kind, the distinction is plain between a grant or covenant that looks to direct physical advantage in the occupation of the
dominant estate, such as light and air, and one which only concerns
it in the indirect way which we have mentioned. The scope of the
covenant and the circumstances show that it is not directed to the
quiet enjoyment of the dominant land.
. Again, this covenant illustrates the further meaning of the rule
against unusual incidents. If it is of a nature to be attached to
land, as the plaintiff contends, it creates an easement of monopoly
-an easement not to be competed with-and in that interest alone
a right to prohibit one owner from exercising the usual incidents

